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A number of important regulatory reforms have been taken forward in the United Kingdom
following the global financial crisis, which began with the tightening of credit conditions in in-
terbank markets in autumn 2007 and the following devastating collapses in summer 2008 in the
United States, United Kingdom, and elsewhere. A series of key initiatives were adopted by the
outgoing Labour Administration in the United Kingdom before the General Election in May
2010.1 These have since been followed by more fundamental institutional reforms, and further
proposed structural revision, by the new Coalition Conservative and Liberal Democrat Govern-
ment that has since taken office. This includes amendment of the underlying statutory basis for
U.K financial regulation and replacement of the former single-integrated authority with a new
central bank based macro-prudential and split-conduct-of-business model. A number of other im-
portant connected financial policies have also been continued, or newly created, over the last two
years. All of this creates an important new blueprint for regulatory reform for possible considera-
tion and adoption in other countries or other policy reform discussions.
Introduction
Her Majesty's Treasury in the United Kingdom published the Draft Financial Services
Bill on January 26, 2012, which will significantly restructure financial regulation for de-
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cades to come. 2 This followed an earlier period of pre-legislative scrutiny between July
and December 2011.3 The Bill provides for substantial institutional reform of the current
single-integrated regulatory approach that was established under the Financial Services
and Markets Act (FSMA) 2000.
Following the General Election in May 2010, the new Coalition Conservative and Lib-
eral Democrat Government has confirmed that it will rebuild financial regulation around
the Bank of England. The former Financial Services Authority (FSA) is to be abandoned
and core prudential regulation is to be transferred to a new subsidiary of the Bank, the
Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA), with conduct of business and markets being
transferred to a separate Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). A new Financial Policy
Committee (FPC) will be set up within the Bank to carry out macro-prudential oversight
of the U.K. financial system. The Bank of England will then become directly responsible
for monetary policy, regulatory policy, and wider financial system oversight, as well as
payments systems and financial infrastructure, under a new central bank based macro-
prudential model.
The changes were originally announced by the Chancellor of the Exchequer at his
Mansion House Address on June 16, 2010,4 with further details being provided in Parlia-
ment by the Financial Secretary Mark Hoban on June 17, 2010. Consultation documents
were issued by the Treasury in July 2010 and February 2011 and then again in June 2011.5
These explained the basis for the changes and outlined the structure of the new institu-
tional system to be created. The reforms have been examined by a Joint Parliamentary
Select Committee on the Draft Bill Report, with the nature and function of the new insti-
tutional structure being considered by a separate Parliamentary Treasury Select Commit-
tee (TSC). Both Committees took evidence and held a number of hearings on the
proposed reforms. The Joint Select Committee released its report on December 19,
2011, with the TSC having published an initial report at the end of January 2011 and
further comment papers on other specific issues following. 6
The Chancellor of the Exchequer, under the Coalition Government, had established a
separate Independent Commission on Banking (ICB) to make recommendations to
strengthen the U.K. banking system and to promote competition following the financial
crisis in the United Kingdom during 2008-2009. The ICB published an Interim Report
2. Financial Services Bill, 2010-12, H.C. Bill [278] (U.K); HM TREASURY, A NEW APPROACH TO Fi-
NANCIAL REGULATION: SECURING STABILITY, PROTECTING CONSUMERS, 2012, Cm. 8268 (U.K.); Finan-
cial Services Bill Explanatory Notes, 2010-12, H.C. Bill [278-EN] (U.K). See also Press Release, HM
Treasury, Government Publishes Financial Services Bill (Jan. 17, 2012) (on file with author).
3. See HM TREASURY, A NEW APPROACH TO FINANCIAL REGULATION: THE BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM,
2011, Cm. 8083, at 51-365 (U.K.).
4. See Hon. George Osbourne, Chancellor of the Exchequer, HM Treasury, Speech at The Lord Mayor's
Dinner for Bankers & Merchants at Mansion House (June 16, 2010).
5. BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM, supra note 3; HM TREASURY, A NEW APPROACH TO FINANCIAL REGULA-
TION: BUILDING A STRONGER SYSTEM, 2011, Cm. 8012 (U.K.); HM TREASURY, A NEW APPROACH TO
FINANCIAL REGULATION: JUDGEMENT, FOCUS AND STABILITY, 2010, Cm. 7874 (U.K.).
6. JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE DRAFT FINANCIAL SERVICES BILL, DRAFT FINANCIAL SERVICES BILL,
2010-12, H.L. 236, H.C. 1447 (U.K.); TREASURY COMMITTEE, FINANCIAL REGULATION: A PRELIMINARY
CONSIDERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSALS, 2010-11, H.C. 430-I (U.K.). For continuing work of
the TSC, see the Committee's website at http://www.parliament.uk/treascom/.
VOL. 46, NO. 3
U.K. REGULATORY REVISION 789
on April 11, 2011 following an earlier issues paper. 7 A final paper was released in Septem-
ber 2011.8 The ICB recommended the establishment of a structural "retail ring-fence"
within the largest U.K. banking groups to insulate household and Small and Medium
Enterprise (SME) account facilities from wholesale and investment banking and to impose
higher capital and loss absorbing debt limits on the ring-fenced operations. The Govern-
ment confirmed that it would implement the recommendations of the ICB in full during
the current Parliamentary session.
The Coalition Government has also taken forward a number of other reform initiatives.
These include converting the earlier Labour Government bank charge into a permanent
"Bank Levy." Earlier bank remuneration reforms are to be continued with a new Code of
Conduct that has been incorporated into the FSA's Handbook of Rules and Guidance
issued under the FSMA.9 The Government has been pressing the major banks to lend to
medium and smaller enterprises and households under "Project Merlin," which finally
came into operation in February 2011.10 This was then terminated in February 2012 and
was to be replaced by a new Government "National Loan Guarantee Scheme" that was
announced by the Chancellor in his Autumn Statement in November 2011.11 The La-
bour Government had also set up the U.K. Financial Investments (UKFI) to hold the
Government's investments in major banks that received capital injections in 2008 and
2009, as well as a separate U.K. Asset Protection Agency (APA) to provide guarantees to
major banks holding distressed (toxic) assets following the crisis. The Government had
separately pressured the major banks to enter into a "Code of Practice on Taxation".on tax
management and avoidance.
The new Coalition Government has accordingly continued or launched a number of
important new initiatives in the financial and regulatory area. Many of these are claimed
to be necessary following the financial crises that devastated national and international
financial markets between 2007 and 2009, although much of it also reflects underlying
political ideology and policy. A number of important reforms had already been instituted
by the outgoing Labour Administration, which included introducing a new Special Reso-
lution Regime (SRR) for banks and the establishment of a Financial Stability Committee
(FSC) within the Bank of England under the Banking Act 2009 with the creation of a
separate inter-agency Council for Financial Stability (CFS) to coordinate macro-pruden-
tial oversight in the United Kingdom. 12 The further post-election reforms announced
continue a substantial part of the earlier regime and revisions, although within a more
centralized and strengthened central bank based institutional model.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the nature and content of the Coalition Gov-
ernment's recent reform program. The policy basis for the revisions is examined with
7. INDEP. COaIM'N ON BANKING, INTERIM REPORT, CONSULTATION ON REFORM OPIONS (2011)
(U.K); E-M TREASURY, INDEP. COMMI'N ON BANKING, ISSUES PAPER, CALL FOR EVIDENCE (2010) (U.K.).
8. INDEP. COMM'N ON BANKING, FINAL REPORT, RECOMMENDATIONS (2011) (UK.); INTERIM RE-
PORT, supra note 7.
9. See FSA, FSA HANDBOOK eh. 19A (2011) (U.K-), available at http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/hand-
book/SYSC/19A.
10. Press Release, HM Treasury, Project Merlin - Government Statement (Feb. 9, 2011), available at http:/
/www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/govagreement_090211 .pdf.
11. Press Release, HM Treasury, National Loan Guarantee Scheme (Dec. 6, 2011) (on file with author); see
also HM TREASURY, AUTUMN STATEMENT 2011, 2011, Cm. 8231, 91 1.115, 2.39 (U.K).
12. See generally Walker, supra note 1 (discussing the earlier Labour Administration reforms).
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reference to the earlier consultation documents in July 2010, February 2011, and June
2011. The structure and content of the Draft Financial Services Bill and emerging shape
of the new institutional regulatory structure in the United Kingdom are then examined in
further detail. Some of the early comments made by the Treasury Select Committee on
financial regulation are noted with the principal recommendations of the Joint Committee
Report on the Financial Services Bill. The proposed function and operations of the PRA
and FCA are reviewed separately. The principal reform suggestions of the ICB in its
Interim and Final Reports in April and September 2011 are referenced. The Govern-
ment's other initiatives-with regard to remuneration, bank levy, bank lending, asset
holdings and guarantees, and taxation-are also reviewed. Provisional comments and
conclusions are drawn with regard to the significance, value, and effectiveness of the new
regulatory model being constructed in the United Kingdom at this time.
I. A New Apporach to Financial Regulation and Building a Stronger System
The new regulatory regime to be set up in the United Kingdom was initially announced
by the Chancellor of the Exchequer during his Mansion House speech on June 16, 2010,
and the Treasury subsequently issued a formal consultation document tided A New Ap-
proach to Financial Regulation on July 2010.13 The paper outlined the causes of the finan-
cial crisis 14 and argued for the need for reform over the earlier tripartite regulatory model
that had been set up under the integrated regulatory structure adopted by the outgoing
Labour Administration under the FSMA 2000. The paper stressed the need to establish a
new macro-prudential regulation regime and the need for the separation of prudential
from consumer protection and market regulation. The enhanced role of the Bank of En-
gland was outlined with the role and function of the proposed FPC, PRA, and a Con-
sumer Protection and Markets Authority (CPMA), which was subsequently renamed to
create the FCA. 15 The paper also commented on markets and infrastructure, crisis man-
agement, and implementation. 16
The Government accepted the complexity of the changes proposed with further consul-
tation documents to be issued in February and June 2011, which included draft legislation
on the main parts of the proposed Reform Bill. Appropriate transitional arrangements
were to be adopted. These included reorganizing the FSA with a "shadow" internal struc-
ture being set up to allocate FSA staff and responsibilities between the PRA and FCA on a
provisional basis. 17 An interim FPC would be set up within the Bank of England by au-
tumn 2010 to carry out preparatory work and to discharge a provisional macro-prudential
function. This would replace the earlier CFS. A number of principles were to guide the
13. JUDGEMENT, Focus AND STABILITY, supra note 5.
14. The fundamental causes of the crisis are summarized in terms of: (a) global economic imbalances; (b)
mispriced and misunderstood risks; (c) unsustainable funding and business models for banks; (d) excessive
build-up of debt across the financial system; and (e) growth of an unregulated "shadow banking" system. Id. 9
2.
15. Id. at 9-40.
16. Id. at 41-56.
17. The FSA would also prepare a new operating model, to be agreed upon before the end of 2010, dealing
with structure, resource, and risk-based supervision within the PRA and CPMA with the Bank being repre-
sented on the internal working committees. Id. T 7.9.
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transitional measures adopted.'1 The July 2010 Green Paper set out the general outline
of the new arrangements, although a number of more detailed matters would have to be
confirmed over time.
The Coalition Government published a follow-up consultation paper in February 2011
titled A New Approach to Financial Regulation: Building a Stronger System.' 9 The Treasury
Select Committee had also published its report on U.K. financial reform, Financial Regula-
tion: A Preliminary Consideration of the Government's Proposals, on February 3, 2011.20 The
Treasury issued its views on the consultation responses received in November 2010, which
were claimed to have generally supported the move to strengthen financial stability and
macro-prudential regulation.21 The Government identified five key themes following the
initial consultation process. The new regulatory authorities' core statutory objectives had
to be balanced and supplemented by other factors. The accountability and transparency
had to be ensured of the PRA, the FCA, and the FPC. The FCA had to discharge a strong
and coherent market regulation function that included acting as U.K. Listing Authority
(UKLA). The authorities had to continue to contribute to the emerging European and
international regulatory agenda during the transitional phase and final "steady" state.
There had to be effective coordination between the new regulatory authorities.
Consultation on the February 2011 paper was limited to April 14, 2011, with this being
justified by the Government in terms of the need to remain within its original legislative
timetable. The Report nevertheless acknowledged the Treasury Select Committee's con-
cern that the quality of the legislation could be compromised if the Government pursued
its timetable too rigidly.22 The Government published a White Paper in February 2011
with a draft Bill for pre-legislative scrutiny (PLS) and with a full twelve Parliamentary
sitting weeks being provided for scrutiny until December 2011, 2 3 which would involve
convening a separate Joint Scrutiny Committee of the House of Commons and House of
Lords to examine the Bill clause by clause. The Government published a further White
Paper with accompanying Explanatory Notes in June 2011 with the Draft Financial Ser-
vices Bill that would amend the FSMA.24 A number of further consultation questions
were raised with the Treasury also commenting on the responses received to the earlier
consultation.25 It was intended that the final draft Bill would be introduced in summer
2011 and receive Royal Assent in summer 2012, although these dates would later have to
be pushed back to spring 2012 and 2013, respectively.
18. These included: (a) maintaining high quality, focused regulation; (b) minimizing uncertainty and tran-
sitional costs for firms; (c) balancing implementation with appropriate scrutiny and consultation; and (d)
providing as much clarity and certainty as possible for FSA, Bank, and other staff. Id. T1 7.5.
19. BUILDING A STRONGER SYSTEM, supra note 5.
20. A PRELIMtNARY CONSIDERATION, supra note 6.
21. HM TREASURY: A NEW APPROACH TO FINANCIAL REGULATION: SU4MmARY OF CONSULTATION RE-
SPONSES (2010) (U.K).
22. Id. T1 8.3.
23. Id. TT 8.5-.6.
24. BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM, supra note 3, at 51-365.
25. Id. at 367-408.
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H. Financial Services Bill
The Draft Financial Services Bill was presented to House of Commons on January 26,
2012.26 The Bill sets out the new framework for financial regulation in the United King-
dom with responsibility for financial stability being placed with the Bank of England.27
This was provided for in the Coalition Government's program statement.28 The Bill sets
out the powers, objectives, and principles for each of the new agencies established, includ-
ing, in particular, the FPC, PRA, and FCA. This involves the transfer of the existing
powers from the FSA to the PRA and the FCA, with certain new powers also being pro-
vided. Provisions are included to secure accountability of the regulatory agencies with
specific provisions on the constitution of their governing bodies. Cooperation is to be
secured through the imposition of a statutory duty to coordinate with each other and
cooperate with the Bank with further provisions governing the coordination of member-
ships of European and international bodies. Specific mechanisms are included governing
the responsibilities between the Treasury, Bank, PRA, and FCA in the event of a financial
crisis.
The Bill is in nine parts and makes amendments to the Bank of England Act 1998 and
FSMA 2000. It contains provisions on mutual societies and collaboration between agen-
cies; further measures on inquiries and investigations, complaints against the regulators,
and amendments to the Banking Act 2009; and certain other miscellaneous and general
matters. The Bill extends to the whole of the United Kingdom and covers matters relat-
ing to U.K. financial services and markets with no powers having been delegated to the
National Assembly for Wales or Scottish Parliament.
A. FLcANCLAL STABILITY OBJECTIVE AND STRATEGY
A new Deputy Governor of the Bank of England is to be appointed for prudential
regulation in addition to the existing Deputy Governors for financial stability and mone-
tary policy.29 The "Financial Stability Objective" of the Bank is strengthened by amend-
ing the language from requiring the Bank to "contribute to protecting and enhancing" to
"protect and enhance" financial stability and replacing the earlier reference to "financial
systems" by with "financial system." 30 The Court of Directors of the Bank is required to
prepare the Bank's "Financial Stability Strategy" following consultation with the FPC and
Treasury. 31 The strategy is to be prepared within six months and reviewed every three
years subject to FPC redommendations. 32
26. Financial Services Bill Explanatory Notes, 2010-12, H.C. Bill [278-EN] (U.K.); SECURING STABIL-
ITY, PROTECTING CONSUMERS, supra note 2; Financial Services Bill Explanatory Notes, supra note 2.
27. BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM, supra note 3, at 282.
28. HM GOVERNMENT, THE COALITION: OUR PROGRAMME FOR GOVERNMENT 9 (2010), available at
www.hmg.gov.uk/programmeforgovemment ("We will reform the regulatory system to avoid a repeat of the
financial crisis. We will bring forward proposals to give the Bank of England control of macro-prudential
regulation and oversight of macro-prudential regulation.").
29. Financial Services Bill, 2012-13, H.L. Bill [25] cl. 1(2) (UK.), available at http://www.publications.
parliament.uk/pa/bills/lbillU2012-2013/0025/lil112012-20130025_en_2.htm#ptl-l lgl.
30. Id.
31. Id. pt. 1, cl. 3(1)(9A).
32. Id. pt. 1, cl. 3(1)(9A)(4).
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The Bill provides for the establishment of the FPC with twelve members consisting of
the Governor, Deputy Governors, Chief Executive of the FCA, two members appointed
by the Governor, four members appointed by the Chancellor, and a Treasury representa-
tive. 33 The FPC is to contribute to the Bank's achievement of its Finance Stability Objec-
tive, in particular, by identifying, monitoring, and taking action to remove or reduce
systemic risks to protect and enhance the resilience of the U.K. financial system.34 A
systemic risk is any risk to the stability of the U.K. financial system as a whole or as a
significant part.35 The Treasury may make recommendations to the FPC at any time in
writing.36 Recommendations must be within the first thirty days of the section coming
into force and annually. 37 The FPC must confirm whether it accepts the recommenda-
tions and the action taken in response. 38
The functions of the FPC are to monitor the stability of the U.K. financial system, issue
directions, make recommendations, and prepare financial stability reports. In carrying out
its functions, it is to have regard to the Bank's financial stability strategy and avoid preju-
dicing the PRA or FCA securing their objectives. The FPC may issue directions to the
FCA or PRA on macro-prudential measures39 or recommendations within the Bank, to
the Treasury or FCA and PRA or other persons. 4° The Bank is to publish a record of each
meeting of the FPC within six weeks except where this may not be in the public interest.4
The FPC is to publish biannual Financial Stability Reports.42 The Governor and Chan-
cellor are to meet following each report with a record of the meeting to be published
within six weeks. 43 The Bank may issue a direction to the FCA and PRA requiring speci-
fied information (or information of a specified description) or the production of specified
documents (or documents of a specified description).44 The information or documents
must reasonably be required in connection with the exercise of its functions with regard to
33. Id. pt. 1, cl. 3(l)(9B).
34. Id. pt. 1, cl. 3(l)(9C).
35. "This includes risks attributable to structural features of financial markets [or] the distribution of risk
within the financial sector and unsustainable levels of leverage, debt or credit growth." Id. pt. 1, cl.
3(1)(9C)(3), (5).
36. The recommendations may relate to the FPC's understanding of the Financial Stability Objective, its
responsibility with regard to the objective or any other matters that the FPC "should have regard in exercis-
ing its functions." Id. pt. 1, cl. 3(1)(9D).
37. Id. pt. 1, cl. 3(l)(9D)(2).
38. Id. pt. 1, cl. 3(1)(9D)(3).
39. The FPC may give directions to the FCA and PRA on macro-prudential measures in relation to a
specified class of regulated persons. Id. pt. 1, cl. 3(1)(9G)(1). The FCA and PRA must comply with the
direction give subject to revocation. Id. pt. 1, cls. 3(l)(9H)-(9I). Macro-prudential measures are to be pre-
scribed by the Treasury by order subject to Parliamentary approval by resolution. Id. pt. 1, cl. 3(l)(9M).
40. The FPC may make recommendations within the Bank concerning financial assistance to financial
institutions or with regard to "payment systems, settlement systems and clearing houses." Id. pt. 1, cl.
3(l)(9N). Recommendations may be made to the Treasury in connection with macro-prudential measures,
regulated activities, activities subject to regulation by the PRA or FAC, or persons required to provide infor-
mation by the PRA. Id. pt. 1, cl. 3(l)(90). "The Financial Policy Committee may make recommendations to
the FCA and PRA about the exercise of their respective functions," except in connection with specified regu-
lated persons. Id. pt. 1, cl. 3(l)(9P). The FPC has a general power to make recommendations to any other
persons subject to being made or confirmed in writing. Id. pt. 1, cl. 3(l)(9Q).
41. Id. pt. 1, cl. 3(l)(9R).
42. Id. pt. 1, cl. 3(l)(9T).
43. Id. pt. 1, cl. 3(l)(9U).
44. Id. pt. 1, cl. 3(1)(9V)(2).
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the Financial Stability Objective, including functions under the Banking Act 2009, system-
ically important market infrastructure, and liquidity support. The Bank must consult with
the FCA and PRA in advance and have regard to the principle of proportionality.45
Certain other general duties are imposed on the PRA. The FPC is to have regard to
the Bank's Financial Stability Strategy in the exercise of its functions.46 In working with
the FCA and the PRA, the FPC is to seek to avoid exercising its functions in a way that
would prejudice the advancement of the operational objectives for the PRA.4 7 The FPC is
also to have regard to the principles of proportionality, disclosure of its views on relevant
threats, and international obligations.48 This reflects some of the general supervisory
principles that were retained from the FSMA and applied to the FCA and PRA with
amendment.
B. FSMA
The Bill makes a number of amendments to the FSMA in connection with regulatory
authorities, regulated activities, permission requirements, passports, performance, official
listing, business transfers, hearings and appeals, rules and guidance, control, recognized
investment exchanges and clearing houses, suspension from trading, discipline and en-
forcement, compensation, Ombudsman, Lloyd's, information, auditors and actuaries, con-
sumer protection and competition, insolvency, and other miscellaneous matters, including
on the Consumer Financial Education Body (CFEB), professional parties, international
obligations, interpretation, and Parliamentary control of secondary legislation in the form
of statutory instruments. 49
1. Financial Conduct Authority (FCA)
The FSMA is amended to rename the FSA the FCA.5° A series of new provisions have
been inserted into the FSMA concerning the FCA's general duties, objectives, power to
amend objectives and guidance on objectives, supervision, monitoring and enforcement,
consultation, and reviews. The general duties of the FCA are defined in terms of securing
its objectives and carrying out its general fimctions.51 In discharging its general functions,
the FCA is to act, insofar as possible, in a way that is compatible with its strategic objective
and advances one or more of its operational objectives. The FCA is assigned a separate
strategic objective of ensuring that relevant markets function well,5 2 with three further
operational objectives of consumer protection, integrity, and competition. 53 The FCA is
45. Id. pt. 1, cl. 3(l)(9WV)(l).
46. Id. pt. 1, cl. 3(l)(9E)(1).
47. Id. pt. 1, cl. 3(l)(9E)(2).
48. Id. pt. 1, cl. 3(1)(9E)(3).
49. Id. pt. 2.
50. Id. pt. 2, cl. 5.
51. Id. pt. 2, cl. 5(l)(IB)(1).
52. This was previously protecting and enhancing confidence in the U.K. financial system under the June
2011 Draft Bill.
53. Id. pt. 2, cl. 5(l)(IB)(2)-(3). "The consumer protection objective is: securing an appropriate degree of
protection for consumers." Id. pt. 2, cl. 5(1)(1C)(1). So doing, the FCA must have regard to differing degrees
of investment and transaction risk, consumer experience, needs, individual responsibility, appropriateness,
and any CFEB and Ombudsman information disclosure. Id. pt. 2, cl. 5(l)(LC)(2). "The integrity objective is:
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also to have regard to specified regulatory principles and the importance of limiting finan-
cial crime.54 The general functions of the FCA are defined in terms of making rules,
preparing and issuing codes, providing general guidance, and determining general policy
principles. 55
The FCA is to maintain arrangements for supervising authorized persons, to determine
compliance, and to take appropriate enforcement action.5 6 The FCA is required to make
and maintain effective arrangements for consulting with practitioners and consumers.
The earlier Practitioner Panel and Smaller Business Practitioner Panel set up under
FSMA are given statutory recognition.5 7 A new Markets Practitioner Panel to represent
the interests of firms and persons affected by the FCA's functions is also to be set up, in
addition to the existing Consumer Panel.5 8 The FCA must consider the representations
made by the panels.5 9 The Treasury may appoint an independent review of the economy,
efficiency, and effectiveness of the way in which the FCA has used its resources with the
person appointed having the right to obtain all necessary documents and information.
60
The constitutional provisions that earlier governed the FSA under Schedule 1 FSMA are
amended to apply to the FCA and PRA.
61
protecting and enhancing the integrity of the [U.K.] financial system." Id. pt. 2, cl. 5(1)(ID)(1). Integrity
includes the soundness, stability, and resilience of the financial system; preventing financial crime and market
abuse; and ensuring orderly operation and transparency in the price formation process. Id. pt. 2, cl.
5(1)(1D)(2). "The competition objective is: promoting effective competition in the interests of consumers in
the markets for regulated financial services" and investment exchange services. Id. pt. 2, cl. 5(l)(IE)(l). The
FCA is to have regard to different consumer needs, changing, entry, and innovation. Id. pt. 2, cl. 5(l)(1E)(2).
The competition objective was previously a separate "securing efficiency and choice" objective that was to
promote efficiency and choice in the market for services (as defined in section 1 C(4)) or services provided by a
recognized investment exchange. Id. pt. 2, cl. 5(l)(1E). Relevant markets and consumer are separately de-
fined with other interpretation provisions. Id. pt. 2, cls. 5(l)(1F)-(11). The U.K. financial system "includes
financial markets and exchanges, regulated activities and other activities connected with financial markets and
exchanges." Id. pt. 2, ci. 5(l)(11). The Treasury may amend the objectives with guidance issued under section
139A to require the FSMA to include FCA guidance on how it will secure its operational objectives. Id. pt. 2,
cls. 5(l)(1J)-(1K).
54. Id. pt. 2, cl. 5(l)(IB)(5). The regulatory principles to be applied by both the FCA and PRA consist of:
(a) resource efficiency; (b) proportionality; (c) consumer responsibility; (d) management responsibility; (e)
disclosure; and () transparency.
55. Id. pt. 2, cl. 5(1)(1B)(6).
56. Id. pt. 2, cl. 5(l)(1L).
57. Id. pt. 2, cls. 5(1)(IN), (10).
58. Id. pt. 2, cls. 5(1)(IlP)(1), (1Q)(l).
59. Id. pt. 2, cl. 5(1)(1R).
60. id. pt. 2, cls. 5(1)(IS)(1), (1T)(1).
61. Schedules 1ZA and IZB FSMA are inserted under Schedule 3 in Bill. Id. sched. 3, sched. 1ZA, pt. 1, 11
1-14 (including specific provisions with regard to constitution, remuneration, internal arrangements, records,
annual report, annual public meeting, report of annual meeting, and audit of accounts); pt. 2, TT 15-17
(regarding status); pt. 3, 9 18-21 (regarding penalties and fees); pt. 4, IT 22-24 (regarding miscellaneous,
including exemption from liability and damages). Equivalent provisions with some amendment are imposed
with regard to the FCA and RPA under Schedule IZB FSMA inserted under Schedule 3. Id. sched. 3, sched.
IZB, pt. 1, 6-14 (regarding additional provisions on appointed members of the governing body); pt. 1,
J 15 (regarding terms of service); pt. 2, $9 24-25 (regarding exemption from the need to use "limited" in its
name). More limited constitutional provisions in respect of the FPC are inserted in Schedule 2A of the BEA
under Schedule 1 of the Bill. Earlier provisions on monitoring and enforcement and on investigation of
complaints were removed from the Schedule in the June 2011 Bill and included in the sections of the January
2012 Bill in light of their importance. ld. pt. 2, cl. 5(1)(IA)(4).
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2. Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA)
The PRA is set up separately under the revised FSMA.62 The Bill includes provisions
with regard to the general duties of the PRA, the imposition of a specific insurance objec-
tive, additional objectives, interpretation and guidance of objectives, supervision, consulta-
tion, and Treasury review of the PRA activities. The PRA is to act, in so far as reasonably
possible, in a way that advances its general objective.63 The general objective of the PRA
is to promote the safety and soundness of PRA-authorized persons, which involves ensur-
ing that the business of such persons is carried out in a way that avoids any adverse effect
on the stability of the U.K. financial system while seeking to ensure that any adverse effect
of the failure of such a person is minimized. 64 The PRA is also to act in a way that is
compatible with both its general objective and insurance objective, which is contributing
to the securing of an appropriate degree of protection for those who are or may become
policyholders.65 Further objectives may be specified where the list of PRA-regulated ac-
tivities is extended by order.66 The PRA is expressly not required to ensure that no PRA-
authorized person fails. 6 7 The PRA is to have regard to the same regulatory principles as
the FCA in discharging its general functions. 68 The PRA is required to consult with PRA-
authorized persons, or persons representing their interests, with appropriate panels being
set up as necessary. 69 The PRA is required to consider any representations made and
publish its responses to such representations from time to time.70 The Treasury is given
equivalent power to appoint an independent review of the economy, efficiency, and effec-
tiveness with which the PRA uses its resources in discharging its functions. 71
3. Common Provisions
The FCA and PRA are collectively referred to as the "regulators. '72 Relevant constitu-
tional investigation of complaints, status, penalties and fees, and other miscellaneous pro-
visions (including immunity from liability in damages) are applied by way of amendment
to Schedule I of the FSMA. 73 Similar regulatory principles to those applicable to the FSA
62. Id. pt. 2, ch. 2, cl. (2A)(1). The Prudential Regulation Authority Limited, which was set up before the
Bill, is renamed the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) for the purposes of the Bill. Id.
63. Id. pt. 2, ch. 2, cl. (2B)(I).
64. Id. pt. 2, ch. 2, cl. (2B)(2)-(3). The adverse effects referred to may result from the disruption of the
continuity of financial services. Id. pt. 2, ch. 2, cl. (2B)(4). The U.K. financial system includes financial
markets and exchanges, regulated activities, and other activities connected with financial markets and ex-
changes. Id. pt. 2, cl. 5(l)(11). Failure includes insolvency, stabilization (under Part I of Banking Act 2009),
or the authorized person is considered to be unable, or likely to be unable, to satisfy claims against it under
the Financial Services Compensation Scheme. Insolvency includes bankruptcy, liquidation, bank insolvency,
administration, bank administration, receivership, composition, or a scheme of arrangement. Id. pt. 2, ch. 2,
cl. (2B).
65. Id. pt. 2, ch. 2, cl. (2C).
66. Id. pt. 2, ch. 2, cl. (2D).
67. Id. pt. 2, ch. 2, cl. (2F).
68. Id. pt. 2, ch. 2, cl. (2G).
69. Id. pt. 2, ch. 2, cl. (2K).
70. Id. pt. 2, ch. 2, cls. (2K)-(2L).
71. Id. pt. 2, ch. 2, cls. (2M)-(2N).
72. Id. pt. 2, ch. 3, cl. (3A)(2).
73. Schedules IZA and IZB FSMA inserted under Schedule 3 Bill. See supra note 61.
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are restated with some amendment for the FCA and PRA. Both authorities are required,
as with the FSA, to have regard for such generally accepted principles of good governance
as are reasonably applicable. 74 New requirements are inserted governing the relationship
between the FCA and PRA. The regulators are required to coordinate the exercise of
their respective qualifying functions, including consulting and exchanging relevant infor-
mation and to use their resources efficiently, economically, and proportionately. 75 The
FCA is responsible for ensuring that with-profit insurance policyholders receive an appro-
priate degree of protection. 76 The regulators are to enter into an MOU specifying their
respective roles and how they will comply with the duty to coordinate imposed regula-
tions. 77 A draft MOU between the FCA and PRA was produced by the Bank of England
and FSA in 2012.78
The Treasury may by orders allocate responsibilities between the regulators, including
specifying primary or sole functions, subject to Parliamentary approval. 79 The PRA is
given express power to direct the FCA not to take any regulatory action against a particu-
lar PRA-authorized person, or class of persons, in the exercise of the FCA's regulatory or
insolvency powers.80 The PRA must consider that the exercise may threaten the stability
of the U.K. financial system or result in the failure of the person concerned, which would
affect the system, and that the direction is necessary for either of these purposes.8' The
PRA must consult the FCA in advance and provide the Treasury with a copy of the direc-
tion, which must be submitted to Parliament.8 2 Either regulator may issue directions to
the other in connection with the consolidated supervision of some or all of the members
of a group under relevant E.U. directives where one acts as the competent authority for
the group. 83 The direction may require the other regulator to exercise, or not exercise, a
relevant function8 4 Both regulators are subject to a general duty to take such steps as are
considered appropriate to coordinate with the Bank in connection with its Financial Sta-
bility Objective and have a duty to notify the Treasury of the possible need for public
74. Id. pt. 2, ch. 3, cl. (3C).
75. Id. pt. 2, ch. 3, cl. (3D)(1).
76. Id. pt. 2, ch. 3, cl. (3F).
77. See id. pt. 2, ch. 3, cl. (3E)(1). Specified further provisions may be included in the MOU dealing with
such matters as Part 4A permission applications, variation, requirements, disclosure, group applications, EEA
passport and treaty rights, information gathering, and investigations, control, incoming firms, Lloyd's of
London, records, and fees. Id. pt. 2, ch. 3, cl. (3E)(2). The MOU must contain provisions governing the
coordination of relations with other non-U.K. bodies, E.U. authorities, and compensation scheme function.
Id. pt. 2, ch. 3, cl. (3E)(3). The MOU must be reviewed annually with a revised copy being provided to the
Treasury that must be laid before Parliament. Id. pt. 2, ch. 3, cl. (3E)(4), (6).
78. See generally Draft Memorandum of Understanding Between the FCA and PRA, FSA (Jan. 27, 2012) (U.K.),
available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/about/what/reg-reform/mou-fca-pra.
79. Financial Services Bill, pt. 2, ch. 3, cls. (3G)-(3H) (U.).
80. Id. pt. 2, ch. 3, cl. (31).
81. See id. pt. 2, ch. 3, cl. (31)(2), (4)-(5). The PRA may revoke the direction at any time. Id. pt. 2, ch. 3, cl.
(3J).
82. Id. pt. 2, ch. 3, cl. (3K)(1), (4)-(5).
83. Id. pt. 2, ch. 3, cl. (3L)(4).
84. Id. pt. 2, ch. 3, cl. (3L)(5). Revocation is dealt with under section 3M with procedural provisions in
section 3N.
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funds, including the sharing of permitted relevant information.8 5 The regulators may
enter into arrangements for the provision of services between themselves.86
III. Treasury Committee Report on Financial Regulation
The Treasury Select Committee within the House of Commons published an initial
report on the Government's proposed revision of U.K. financial regulation at the end of
January 2011.87 This followed the Government's original consultation paper titled A New
Approach to Financial Regulation:Judgement, Focus and Stability, published in July 2010, and
anticipated the later follow-up document published in February 2011 and titled A New
Approach to Financial Regulation: Building a Stronger System.s s The Treasury Committee
examined a number of provisional issues related to the proposed regulatory changes an-
nounced. These were principally concerned with the ambitious nature of the Govern-
ment's timetable, references to the Bank of England as a "super regulator," the role and
function of the PRA and FCA as well as regulatory cost, international regulatory integra-
tion, crisis management, transparency, and accountability. Each of these issues was con-
sidered in separate chapters within the February 2011 Report.
The Report noted the importance of the financial services industry within the U.K.
economy and the need for it to be regulated in an effective but proportionate manner.
The Committee was concerned that unnecessary urgency could be counter-productive,
both in terms of financial stability and of certainty. 9 The Committee accepted the advan-
tage of insulating economic policy from short-term political decision-making, although
difficulties remained in defining and managing financial stability and the new macro-pru-
dential policy. The Government had to confirm the nature of possible tools through the
publication of draft secondary legislation in early course.
The Treasury Committee accepted that the purpose of regulatory reform was to reduce
the possibility of systemic risk without undermining the economic contribution of finan-
cial services. The financial services industry contributed around 10 percent of U.K. GDP
in 2009 and was still the largest corporation taxpayer in 2010, responsible for 11.2 percent
of total tax receipts.90 The financial crisis nevertheless cost the U.K. Government 74
85. See id. pt. 2, ch. 3, cl. (3P); pt. 4, cls. 54-55.
86. Id. pt. 2, ch. 3, cl. (3Q)(I).
87. A PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATION OF THE GOV'T'S PROPOSALS, supra note 6, at 27.
88. See JUDGEMlENT, Focus AND STABILITY, supra note 5; BUILDING A STRONGER SYSTEM, supra note 5.
89. A PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATION OF THE GOV'T'S PROPOSALS, supra note 6, at 3.
90. Duncan McKenzie, Financial Markets in the UK, THECITYUK, Nov. 2010, at 3, http://www.thecityuk.
com/assets/Uploads/FM201011.pdf; see also PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, THE TOTAL TAX CONTRIBu-
TION OF UK FINANCIAL SERVICES (3d ed. 2010), at 3, available at http://www.cityoflondon.gov.uklbusiness/
economic-research-and-information/research-publications/Documents/research-2010fTotal%2OTax%20
Contribution%20of%2Y0UK%20Financial%20ServicesThirdEdition.pdf. The Financial Services Sector
Employed 993,000 people by sector end June 2012. McKenzie, supra, at 3. Banking made up 4.7 percent of
GDP; insurance, 2 percent; fund management, 0.67 percent; and securities, derivatives, commodities, and
bullion the remaining 2.63 percent. Id. at 6, 7, 10. The London Equity market was the second largest in the
world with eleven percent of global market share in 2009. A PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATION OF THE
GOV'T'S PROPOSALS, supra note 6, at 8. The insurance industry was the largest in Europe and third largest in
the world with premiums in 2009 of £200 billion of premiums alone in 2009. Id. Lloyd's of London gener-
ated £22 billion of premia alone in 2009. Id. at 11. The U.K. fund management industry was the largest in
the world with £4.1 trillion of assets under management in 2009. Id. at 8.
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percent of GDP and the U.S. Government 73 percent of GDP.91 Total global output in
2009 was around 6.5 percent lower than expected following the crisis. 92
The Committee considered that the FPC should have a strong non-Bank representative
element with separate accountability regimes having to be set up in respect of the FPC
and the Bank's MPC. The regulatory approach to be adopted by the PRA, in respect of
systemically important institutions, 93 had to be confirmed with the description of the FCA
as being a "consumer champion" being "inappropriate, confusing and potentially danger-
ous."94 The Committee supported the competition objective of the FCA although the
overall cost of regulation had to be confirmed further as ultimately all direct and indirect
costs would be passed back to the consumer. Uncertainties also remained with regard to
the regulation of certain sectors and the division of responsibility between the PRA and
the FCA, such as with regard to fund management and more complex groups.
IV. Joint Committee Report
The Joint Parliamentary Committee published its First Report on the Draft Financial
Services Bill in December 2011.95 The Joint Committee Report contained a number of
recommendations to ensure that the new regulatory regime set up under the Bill secured
its intended objective of preventing any future calamitous systemic failure of the U.K-
financial sector. The recommendations were specifically intended to ensure that the new
91. Piergiorgio Allesandri & Andrew G. Holdane, Banking on the State, BANE ENG. 23 (Nov. 2009), http://
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2009/speech4O9.pdf (based on a presentation
delivered at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago twelfth annual International Banking Conference on "The
International Financial Crisis: Have the Rules of Finance Changed?").
92. Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir. of Fin. Stability at the Bank of Eng., Comments at the Institute of
Regulation & Risk, Hong Kong, The $100 Billion Question (Mar. 30, 2010), at 2, available at http://www.bis.
org/review/r 100406d.pdf.
93. See, e.g., FSB, POLICY MEASURES TO ADDRESS SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT~ FINANCIAL INSTITITUTIONS
(Nov. 4, 2011) (U.K.), http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/rl 11 104bb.pdf; FSB, EFFECTIVE
RESOLUTION OF SYSTEMICALLY ImPORTANT FINANCIAL INsTITUTIONS (July 19, 2011) (U.K.), http://www.
financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_1 10719.pdf; FSB, REDUCING THE MORAL HAZARD POSED BY SYS-
TEMICALLY IMPORTAN-T FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: FSB RECOMMENDATIONS AND TIME LINES (Oct. 20,
2010) (U.K), http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/rl0l11 la.pdf; FSB, REDUCING THE
MORAL HAZARD POSED BY SYSTEMICALLY LMPORTANT FINANCIAL INSTrTUrtONS: INTERIM REPORT TO
G20 LEADERS (June 18, 2010), (U.K.) http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/rl00627b.pdf.
See also MACROECONOMIC ASSESSMENT GROUP, FSB & BASEL COMMITEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION,
ASSESSMENT OF THE MACROECONOMIC IMPACT OF HIGHER Loss ABSORBENCY FOR GLOBAL SYSTEMS-
CALLY IMPORTANT BANKS (Oct. 10, 2011) (U.K), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs202.pdf; BASEL COsvmrrrEF
ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BIS, GLOBAL SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT BANKS: ASSESSMENT METHODOL-
OGY AND THE ADDITIONAL Loss ABSORBENCY REQUIRFAIENr (July 2011), http://www.bis.org/publ/
bcbs20l.pdf; Press Release, Bank for Int'l Settlements, Measures for Global Systemically Important Banks
Agreed by the Grp. of Governors and Heads of Supervision (June 25, 2011), http://www.bis.org/press
p110625.htm; IMF, BIS & FSB, REPORT TO G20 FINANCE MNMSTERS AND GOVERNORS, GUIDANCE TO
ASSESS THE SYSTEMIC IMPORTANCE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, MARKETS AND INSTRUMENrrS: INITIAL
CONSIDERATIONS (Oct. 2009), http://www.bis.org/publ/othp07.pdf; FSB, UNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL
LINKAGES: A COMMON DATA TEMPLATE FOR GLOBAL SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT BANKS (Oct. 6, 2011)
(U.K.), http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/rl 1006.pdf.
94. A PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATION OF THE Gov'T's PROPOSALS, supra note 6, at 4.
95. JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE DRAFT FINANCIAL SERVICES BILL, DRAr-r FINANCIAL SERVICES BILL,
2010-12, H.L. 236, H.C. 1447 (U.K.).
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authorities had the correct objectives, powers, and responsibilities and that appropriate
systems of accountability were in place. The Joint Committee specifically considered the
objectives of the FPC, the PRA, and the FCA; their responsibilities and powers; and the
need to establish an appropriate accountability, transparency, and enforcement regime.96
The Joint Committee accepted that no regulatory structure could prevent any future
banking failures or crises, irrespective of how well it was designed, with legislation having
to make proper provision for handling crises and resolving bank failures. The crisis had
significant economic, social, and political impact within the United Kingdom and high-
lighted weaknesses in the earlier tripartite regulatory structure, FSA supervision and crisis
management arrangements, and resolution procedures. It was considered that successful
regulation was dependent more on the regulatory culture, focus, and philosophy than
structure in ensuring the effective handling of risk. The assumption of rational perfect
markets was questioned and the earlier U.K. regulatory structure criticized for not having
being focused on financial stability. The Joint Committee recommended the adoption of
a key "cultural change" towards the adoption of a more "forward looking supervision"
approach, with regulatory staff having appropriate experience, approach, and attitude.
The Joint Committee Report was more concerned with culture from a regulatory, rather
than internal firm, perspective, although it did stress the need for effective risk manage-
ment overall. The Report made repeated reference to the ICB recommendations on ring-
fencing and higher capital requirements. 97 The Joint Committee strongly supported the
ICB proposals and recommended that the legislation be brought forward during the 2012-
2013 Parliamentary Session to provide banks with a clear framework for implementing the
recommendations as quickly as possible.
The Joint Committee recommended that the Treasury and Parliament be given more
oversight powers over the macro-prudential activities of the FPC. The recommendations
included replacing the Bank of England's Court of Directors with a "Supervisory Board"
that would include some members with direct experience of operating in the financial
services industry. The Supervisory Board should have specific responsibility to review the
performance of the FPC and to be consulted on the appointment of any new Governor to
the Bank. The FPC should be treated on an equal basis with the Bank's existing Monetary
Policy Committee (MPC) with FPC membership being extended to include insurance and
wider economic interest. External members should have a majority voting position as
against internal Bank staff with reports on major regulatory failure being prepared on a
regular basis. The objectives of the PRA and FSA should be clarified. A number of spe-
cific recommendations were made to extend the powers of the PRA and FCA.
V. Prudential Regulation Authority
The Bank of England and the FSA issued a joint paper in May 2011 on the supervisory
approach to be adopted by the Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA).98 A separate paper
on the supervision of insurance companies was to be released in May 2011, although this
96. Id. at 7, 13, 22, 26-27.
97. See infra Part VII.
98. BANK OF ENGLAND & FSA, THE BANK OF ENGLAND, PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AUTHORITY: OUR
APPROACH TO BANKING SUPERVISION (May 2011), http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Docu-
ments/other/financialstability/uk-reg framework/pra-approach.pdf.
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was delayed until June 2011 with a separate paper on the FCA. Both documents were
updated in 2012.99 The Bank and FSA had arranged a launch Conference for the PRA on
May 19, 2011.
The role of the PRA would undertake the key regulatory functions within the new
regime as it would principally be responsible for supervising firms holding at least £9
trillion in assets, which was seven times the U.K. GDP with U.K. banks alone holding five
times the U.K. GDP.I 0 The PRA would regulate 157 U.K.-incorporated banks, 48
building societies, 652 credit unions, and 162 branches of overseas banks from the Euro-
pean Economic Area (EEA) and globally.l0 Around 2,000 firms would be subject to PRA
oversight.102
The PRA supervisory paper deals with underlying supervisory principles, scope, risk
assessment framework, supervision, policymaking and firm authorization, and individual
approval. The new approach was being developed by the Prudential Business Unit, which
was set up within the FSA on April 4, 2011, in cooperation with the Bank of England.10 3
A. PRA PRINCIPLES
The single objective of the PRA would be to promote the safety and soundness of regu-
lated firms and, in so doing, to minimize any adverse effects of firm failure on the U.K.
financial system. The PRA would not be required to ensure that no authorized firm fails,
which would remain the responsibility of firm management, board, and shareholders.' 04
PRA supervision would be targeted at firms' resilience (capital, liquidity, and leverage),
interventions, and resolution. 1 5 All firms would be subject to a baseline level of supervi-
sory oversight, which would reduce the probability of failure or that a firm failed in an
orderly manner.' 06 The PRA would work closely with the Financial Policy Committee
(FPC) within the Bank to combine individual and larger system's oversight.' 0 7 Supervi-
99. See FSA, THE FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY: APPROACH TO REGULATION (June 2011) (UK),
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/events/fcaapproach.pdf; and BANK OF ENGLAND & FSA, THE BANK OF EN-
GLAND, PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AUTHORITY: OUR APPROACH TO INSURANCE SUPERVISION (June
2011), http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/other/financialstability/ukjreg-framework/
pra-approach2.pdf. See also BANsz OF ENGLAND & FSA, THE BANK OF ENGLAND, PRUDENTIAL REGULA-
TION AUTHORITY: OUR APPROACH TO BANKING SUPERVISION (Oct. 2012), http://www.bankofengland
.co.uk/puhlications/Documents/other/pra/bankingapprl2 0.pdf; and BANK OF ENGLAND & FSA, THE BANK
OF ENGLAND, PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AUTHORITY: OUR APPROACH TO INSURANCE SUPERVISION
(Oct. 2012), http://www.bankofengland.cn.uk/publications/Documents/other/pra/insuranceappr21 0.pdf
For discussion on the Financial Conduct Authority, see infra Part VI.
100. OUR APPROACH TO INSURANCE SUPERVISION, supra note 98, at 7.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Arun Srivastava et al., Replacing the FSA: Responding to the New Regulatory Arcbitecture, BAKER & MC-
KENZIE, March 2011, at 6, http://www.bakermckenzie.com/files/Publication/8f4935a8-d6f7-4f23-821 e-ee91
a3 ec61 fe/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/dd8cd5c6-b659-49c1-bbea-f23 ff090643b/al-london-respond-
ingregulatoryarchitecture-marll.pdf. See generally Prudential Business Unit, FSA, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/
about/who/management/retail (last visited Oct. 5, 2012).
104. OUR APPROACH TO INSURANCE SUPERVISION, supra note 98, 1 3.
105. Id. 934.
106. Id. 96.
107. Id. 93 7.
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sion would be risk based, targeted at the principal risks, be forward-looking, and require
corrective action at an early stage to reduce the probability of disorderly failure.' 0s
Supervisory staff would be required to form judgments on current and future risks to a
firm's safety and soundness, with major judgments requiring the involvement of senior
and experienced individuals. The process was referred to as "rigorous and well-docu-
mented."109 Arrangements would be adopted to ensure cooperation between the PRA,
the FCA, the FPC, the Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS), the Special Res-
olution Unit (SRU), and other parts of the Bank involved with macro-prudential analysis,
market intelligence, and infrastructure oversight." 0 The new policy would attempt to
learn from the lessons of previous regulatory failures, as well as be properly coordinated
with international and E.U. regulatory developments and ensure proper public
accountability. II
B. PRA SCOPE
The PRA would be responsible for the regulation of firms holding £9 trillion in assets
and EEA firms with £2 trillion in assets." 2 The U.K. market was nevertheless highly
concentrated with "[85] percent of personal current accounts being provided by the five
largest firms."" 3 Financial services contributed 10 percent of U.K. GDP and banking
contributed 5 percent of U.K. GDP.114 The PRA would also be responsible for the super-
vision of other firms that could present a significant risk to the stability of the financial
system or to one or more PRA supervised entities within the same group." 5 It was ex-
pected that this would include investment firms authorized to deal in investments as prin-
cipal on their own account subject to additional designation criteria having regard to the
size of the firm, substitutability of services, complexity, and interconnectedness. Other
shadow banking activities may also be brought within the scope of supervision with the
FPC monitoring the new "regulatory perimeter."
C. PRA RISK ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK
The PRA would focus its resources on firms that generated the greatest risk to the
stability of the U.K. financial system." 6 A provisional risk assessment framework had
been produced based on "gross risk" and "safety and soundness" with an assessment of
potential impact and "risk context" (external and business risks) with regard to gross risk
and risk mitigation factors in connection with safety and soundness, including operational
(risk management and controls and management and governance), financial (liquidity and
capital), and structural mitigation (resolvability).ll7 This would assess the impact of firm
108. Id. 9 12.
109. Id. 15.
110. Id. 16.




115. Id. 1 25.
116. Id. 26.
117. FwNciA. CoN'DucT AuTHoTrry: APPROACH TO REGULATION, supra note 99, Fig. 1.
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failure on the stability of the system and on whether orderly resolution was feasible and
credible." 8 The channels through which a firm might affect the stability of the system
would be assessed having regard to impairment of the system to carry out its functions.
The PRA would take into account loss of access to payment services." 19
In considering risk context, the PRA would assess how the external macroeconomic and
business context may affect the execution of a firm's business model under different scena-
rios. The PRA would then assess factors that may mitigate the adverse impact of a firm on
the stability of the system including resolvability, financial strength (liquidity and capital),
and risk management and governance.' 20
D. PRA SUPERvWSION
The PRA's approach to supervisory assessment was again described as being based on
"forward-looking [judgments]" with "supervisory interventions" being clearly directed at
reducing any major risk to the stability of the system. 121 All firms would be subject to a
baseline level of supervisory reporting with the PRA's approach being more intensive
where firms posed a greater risk to the system. 122 Supervisory assessment would be fo-
cused on business risks, financial strength, risk management and governance, and
resolvability. 123 The PRA would work closely with auditors and internal finance, risk and
compliance functions within firms, and use available external data.' 24 The PRA would
identify where further corrective action was required by firms 12s and use its statutory pow-
ers to secure necessary and remedial action on an ex ante basis. 1
26
The PRA would create a new "Proactive Intervention Framework" (PIF) to support the
early identification of risks and actions in preparation for failure or resolution. 127 This
would be based on five stages of low risk to the viability of the firm, with no additional
supervisory action being required; moderate, material, and imminent risks to the viability
of the firm (Stages 2, 3, and 4), with specified recovery and resolution actions; and final
resolution and winding-up (Stage 5).128 All firms would be placed within the PIF as ap-
propriate although necessary adjustments would have to be made for dealing with EEA
firms due to the limited powers available to the PRA under E.U. law.
E. PRA POLICY
Prudential policies were stated to set out the high-level framework and expectations
against which firms were to be assessed with prudential rules establishing minimum stan-
118. OUR APPROACH TO INSURANCE SUPERVISION, supra note 98, 1 27.
119. Id. 28-31.
120. Id. 1 32-36.
121. Id. 37.
122. Id. J 38, 40.
123. Id. 91 46-64.
124. Id. 1J9 65-74.
125. ld. 1 75.
126. Id. 91 80.
127. Id. at Box 5.
128. Id. at Box A.
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dards and prudential policy supporting judgment-based supervision. 29 Policies and rules
should be clear, intent, robust, and support timely intervention 130 with firms being re-
quired to comply with "the spirit as well as the letter of its rules." 13 The PRA would
continue to use cost and benefit analysis 132 and be responsible for ensuring that remunera-
tion policies and practices were properly risk aligned.133
F. PRA AUTHORIZATION AND APPROVAL
The PRA would deal with applications for authorization 134 with an assessment of
resolvability being "embedded into the [authorization] process." 135 Authorization would
be determined on a "'whole firm' basis,"I 36with the FCA having to consent on the grant of
relevant permission.137 The PRA would determine the approval of individuals carrying on
significant influence functions in cooperation with the FCA. It was expected that this
would include around 5,000 individuals within the 2,000 firms regulated by the PRA cov-
ering approximately 12,500 roles.' 38
VI. Financial Conduct Authority
The strategic objective of the FCA was stated in the earlier consultation documents to
be to "protect and enhance confidence in the [U.K.] financial system" with three opera-
tional objectives of "securing an appropriate degree of protection for consumers," pro-
moting "efficiency and choice in the market for financial services," and "protecting and
enhancing" financial system integrity.139 This was later amended in the January 2012 Bill
with the FCA's strategic objective being to "[ensure) that the relevant markets function
well" and with the three further operational objectives of consumer protection, integrity,
and competition." 40
The FSA held an FCA launch Conference in London in June 2011 to discuss the FCA's
new regulatory approach and operating model. 141 The FCA's new regulatory approach
can be summarized in terms of "preventative action," tackling problems rather than symp-
toms, differentiation, securing fair and safe markets, "engaging with retail consumers,"
"credible deterrence" in addition to proper transparency and disclosure as well as account-
129. Id. 91.
130. Id. T] 92.
131. Id. 93.
132. Id. 1 105.
133. Id. 9] 107.
134. Id. T] 110.
135. Id. T 113.
136. Id. T] 112.
137. Id. T] 114.
138. Id. 1 118.
139. BUILDING A STRONGER SYSTEM, supra note 5, at 61-62.
140. SECURING STABILITY, PROTECTING CONSUMERS, supra note 2, at 28.
141. See, e.g., Hector Sants, Chief Exec., FSA, Speech at the Financial Conduct Authority Conference (June
28, 2011), available at http://www.fsa.gov.ukfdibrary/communication/speeches/2011/0628-hs.shtml; see also
Margaret Cole, Interim Managing Dir. of the Conduct Bus. Unit, FSA, Financial Conduct Authority: A New
Regulatory Approach (une 28, 2011), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/speeches/
2011/0628_mc.shtml.
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ability.' 42 The FCA will have new powers of product intervention, although the FSA has
already issued substantial new guidelines in this regard. The FCA will be able to withdraw
or amend misleading financial promotions and publish information on relevant issues us-
ing warning notices, although these are connected with technical powers rather than any
new regulatory approach.14 3 The FCA will be expected to make more "[judgmental]
trade-offs" between different, desirable objectives.' 44 The FCA will attempt to develop a
new regulatory culture and "aspire to command the respect of consumers and of the firms
it regulates."14 s It will have a new organizational culture and behavior that "reflects, and
is best equipped to deliver, its new role and wide-ranging responsibilities" with a culture
based on "[judgment] and sound analysis."146 It will also be transparent and cooperative,
as well as clear and succinct, taking prompt action to achieve its goals.147 Its decision-
making process will, in particular, consist of a "senior level, high quality, business and
market analysis team" that will provide the analysis required "to understand how markets
work and how they interact with consumer [behavior]."148 This is already reflected in the
FSA's new post-crisis supervisory response, especially in such areas as product regulation.
It was also announced in January 2012, at the time of the release of the full Draft Finan-
cial Services Bill, that the FCA would become responsible for consumer credit regulation
under the Consumer Credit Act 1974.t49 These functions were previously carried out by
the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) in the United Kingdom. The Government had released
an earlier consultation document on the transfer of these functions in December 2010.t50
VII. Independent Commission on Banking
The Independent Commission on Banking (ICB) produced its interim report on April
11, 2011.151 This contained a number of provisional recommendations to strengthen the
U.K. banking system and to promote competition at the same time as avoid the costs of
any future bailout being born by the public through the Treasury.15 2 The ICB was origi-
nally set up by the Chancellor of the Exchequer on June 16, 2010 and was to report to the
142. FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHoRrrY: APPROACH TO REGULATION, supra note 99, 4.3, 4.6, 4.8-4.10,
4.13, 4.16-4.17.





148. Id. ' 1.19.
149. Press Release, HM Treasury, Government Publishes Financial Services Bill (Jan. 27, 2012), http://
www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/press_08 12.htm.
150. HM TREASURY, A NEW APPROACH TO FINANCIAL REGULATION: CONSULTATION ON REFORMING
THE CONSUMER CREDIT REGIME (Dec. 2010) (U.K.); see also HM TREASURY, A NEW APPROACH To FLAN-
cLAL REGULATION: SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO CONSULTATION ON REFORMING THE CONSUMER
CREDIT REGIME (July 2011) (U.K); DEPARTMENT FOR BUSINESS INNOVATION & SKILLS, OPTsONS FOR
REFORM TO REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR CONSUMER CREDIT (Dec. 2010) (U.K.). The EM Treasury's
consultation documents and impact assessment related to reforming the consumer credit regime are available
online at: http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/consuls-consumercredit.htm.
151. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 7.
152. Id.
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Cabinet Committee on Banking Reform by the end of September 2011.153 The ICB was
chaired by SirJohn Vickers with Clare Spotswood, Martin Taylor, Bill Winters, and Mar-
tin Wolf.'s4 The Commission held around nine meetings between July 2010 and April
2011 with separate public events in Cardiff and London.
The Commission published an initial Issues Paper in September 2010 as a call for evi-
dence that contained a number of possible options for reform. 15 5 The Issues Paper ex-
amined the U.K. banking sector (Chapter 2, "Where we are now"),156 relevant issues
(Chapter 3, "Issues"),157 and options for reform (Chapter 4).158 The issues identified by
the Commission included financial stability, competition, interaction of financial stability
and competition, lending and the pace of economic recovery, the competitiveness of U.K.
financial services and the wider economy, and the risk to the Government's fiscal posi-
tion.159 Separate structural and non-structural reform options were identified with regard
to banks and markets.
The objective of the Interim Report was to set out the Commission's initial and provi-
sional views on stability and competition reform.160 The Report was generally based on
the premise that improved stability requires that banks can absorb losses without reliance
on the taxpayer and that businesses can fail safely without undue damage to the rest of the
financial system and wider economy. This has partly been dealt with by separate initia-
tives to improve capital and liquidity, recovery and resolution, and market infrastructure,
although the Commission attempted specifically to consider whether structural separa-
tion-in particular, between retail and investment banking-would promote stability.161
The ICB rejected more draconian structural options, including separating commercial and
investment banking outright or adopting a full "subsidiarisation" model that would sepa-
rate these activities across different companies within larger groups. A more limited form
of partial subsidiarisation was recommended with the insulation of retail operations to
protect depositors and the provision of critical functions. An equity Tier 1 capital ratio of
at least 10 percent would be imposed on the retail activities of systemically important
lenders with a 7 percent ratio for wholesale and investment banking. This would be sup-
plemented by additional convertible debt.
The ICB released its Final Report on September 12, 2011, which set out its full recom-
mendations following the further consultation responses received to its Interim Report in
April 2011.162 The ICB had received 170 responses with a substantial amount of further
153. Press Release, HM Treasury, SirJohn Vickers to Chair the Indep. Comm'n on Banking (June 16, 2010)
(U.K), http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/pressl1 10.htm.
154. The Independent Commission on Banking: Background, HM TREASuRY, http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/
fin.stabiity.regreform.icb.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2012).
155. CALL FOR EVIDENCE, supra note 7.
156. Id. at 9.
157. Id. at 17.
158. Id. at 31.
159. Id. at 17-29.
160. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 7, at 1.
161. Id. at 3.
162. FINAL REPORT, supra note 8, at 23.
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analytical work having been conducted, in particular, on the design of the ring-fence and
the cost benefit analysis of the reforms proposed1 63
In introducing the Final Report, Sir John Vickers noted that the Commission had con-
sidered the recent deteriorating economic conditions over summer 2011 and associated
regulatory developments within Europe and at the international level.164 SirJohn restated
the Commission's earlier aim of creating a more stable and competitive U.K. banking
system. This had to be less likely to cause or be susceptible to financial crises, avoid the
taxpayer being responsible for the losses generated, and be more effective and efficient in
providing the core services of safeguarding retail deposits, operating secure payments sys-
tems, and channeling savings to productive investments in the economy.
The ICB confirmed its provisional recommendations of requiring banks to hold more
equity capital and loss absorbing debt and with retail banking activities being structurally
separated within a retail ring-fence.' 65 Structural separation was stated to insulate vital
retail banking services from global disturbances, to make it easier and less costly to resolve
banks, and to improve competitiveness. The ring-fence would be strong but flexible.
Only core mandated services would be permitted within the ring-fence; certain activities
would constitute prohibited services, while others either being held within or outside the
ring-fence at the bank's option. Ring-fenced banks had to be self-standing subsidiaries
with sufficient own capital, governance arrangements and independence, and with intra-
group lending restrictions applying to protect the integrity of the ring-fence.
Equity capital levels for ring-fenced institutions would be increased to at least 10 per-
cent of risk-weighted assets with corresponding limits on leverage and with ring-fenced
and non-ring-fenced entities being required to hold an additional seven to 10 percent of
loss absorbing capital in the form of convertible debt or "bail-in" bonds. 166 Insured de-
positors would receive an automatic "depositor preference" on the insolvency of a ring-
fenced bank.
The Commission remained concerned with the lack of competition within U.K. retail
banking and especially with Personal Current Accounts (PCAs) and Small and Medium-
Sized Enterprise (SME) banking services being over-concentrated. The divestiture of
branches and business from Lloyds Banking Group (LBG) would be insufficient to allow
the emergence of a strong challenger bank within the industry although the ICB did not
recommend any increase in the European Commission's original number of branches to
be disposed. Customers should be able to transfer accounts between banks with an effec-
tive switching system being set up within two years and with service transparency being
increased. The new FCA to be set up in the U.K. should be given a specific competition
objective. The ICB did not recommend that banking markets be referred to the Competi-
tion Commission for independent investigation at that stage although a market investiga-
tion reference may be required if its other recommendations were not brought into effect
by 2015. The ICB's general recommendations should otherwise be implemented by the
163. INDEP. COMLM'N ON BANKING, RESPONSES TO INTERIM REPORT (July 13, 2011) (U.YK), http://bank-
ingcommission.independent.gov.uk/?page-id=83 5.
164. HM TREASURY, INDEP. COMM'N ON BANKING, FINAL REPORT PUBLICATION OPENING REMARKS BY
SIR JOHN VICKERS (2010) (U.K.), available at http://bankingcomfission.independent.gov.u/.
165. FINAL REPORT, supra note 8, at 7-18.
166. Id. at 13.
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beginning of 2019 in line with the new Basel Committee recommendations on bank capi-
tal adequacy and liquidity (Basel III).
The Final Report examined financial stability in terms of providing an overview of the
Commission's approach and proposals (Chapter 2)167 with a more detailed examination of
its recommendations on the retail ring-fence (Chapter 3),16 8 loss absorbency (Chapter
4),169 and the economic impact and implementation of its financial stability reforms
(Chapter 5).170 On competition, the Report contains an overview of relevant competition
concerns, market assessment, and consequent recommendations (Chapters 6, 7, and 8).171
In addition to final recommendations (Chapter 9),172 the Report contains a glossary, a
summary of responses to the Interim Report, a review of other financial stability and
competition reforms, an assessment of the economic impact of the stability recommenda-
tions, and a response to criticism of the competition analysis set out in the Interim Report
(Annexes 1-4). 173
The Government published its response to the ICB Report on December 19, 2011.174
The Chancellor of the Exchequer issued a statement on banking reform in the House of
Commons.175 The Chancellor noted that Britain should remain one of the world's lead-
ing financial centers with financial services employing 1.4 million jobs and the banking
system being almost 500 percent of GDP.176 Action would accordingly be taken to
strengthen the regulatory system with the creation of the FPC and PRA and with the
Government undertaking to implement the principal recommendations of the ICB. The
total amount of official support for the U.K. financial system during the financial crisis
was stated to be £1.2 trillion by the National Audit Office (NAO). 177 The Chancellor
'referred to this as "the British Dilemma" with the banking system providing vital services
167. Id. at 23.
168. Id. at 35.
169. Id. at 79.
170. Id. at 123.
171. Id. at 165.
172. Id. at 233.
173. Id. at 253-356.
174. HM TREASURY, THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON BANKING,
2011, Cm. 8252 (U.K.).
175. Rt. Hon George Osborne, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Banking Reform Statement by the Chancellor
of the Exchequer (Dec. 19, 2011), http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/statementcchx_191211.hm.
176. Id.
177. One-hundred and twenty four billion pounds sterling was provided directly in funds including through
the purchase of RBS Ordinary and B Shares (£45.8 billion), LBG shares (£20.6 billion), Northern Rock Plc.
shares (£1.4 billion), Northern Rock (Asset Management) Loan (£21.6 billion), Bradford & Bingley Working
Capital Facility (£8.6 billion), and other loans to support deposits (£26 billion). NAT'L AUDIT OFFICE, HM
TREASURY, THE COMPTROLLER AND AUDITOR GENERAL'S REPORT ON ACCOUNTS TO THE HOUSE OF
COMMONS: THE FINANCIAL STABILITY INTERVEN TIONS 8 (July 13, 2011) (U.K.). A potential liability of
£1.03 trillion was also taken on through guarantees and contingent liabilities including in respect of Northern
Rock (Guaranteed Liabilities of£24 billion, Contingent Capital of£3.4 billion, and unused Working Capital
Facility of £3.8 billion), Bradford & Bingley (Guaranteed Liabilities of £17 billion and unused Working
Capital Facility of£3 billion), RBS and LBG (Asset Protection Scheme of£457 billion and Contingent Capi-
tal in RBS of £8 billion), as well as other sector-wide schemes, including the Credit Guarantee Scheme (£20
billion), Special Liquidity Scheme (£200 billion), Asset Backed Securities Scheme (£50 billion), Recapitalisa-
tion Fund (£13 billon), and unused facilities for loans to support deposits (£310 million). Id. at 6.
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and the United Kingdom being an important global financial center while the total size of
U.K. financial services could not be "underwritten by the British taxpayer." 78
The Government supported the ICB key objectives of making banks better able to ab-
sorb losses, making it easier and less costly to sort out banks that get into trouble and to
limit incentives for excessive risk-taking.i79 A dual approach would be adopted through
the ring-fencing of vital banking services and increasing banks' loss absorbency. The
Government agreed that vital banking services, and in particular retail deposits, should be
provided through ring-fenced banks that should be prohibited from undertaking certain
investment banking activities. Mandated services within the ring-fence would consist of
retail and SME deposits and overdrafts with wholesale investment banking services being
prohibited, although ring-fenced banks would be allowed to conduct certain ancillary set-
vices in support of their core functions. Ring-fenced banks would be legally and opera-
tionally independent and not dependent on the rest of the group for liquidity and
solvency. Further work would be undertaken to implement all of the principles made with
the Government also considering whether a de minimis exemption should be provided.
The Government supported the ICB's recommendations on loss absorbency in addition
to structural ring-fencing. 180 Higher equity requirements would be introduced for large
ring-fenced banks with necessary flexibility being obtained through E.U. measures. A
minimum leverage ratio would be applied to all banks with a higher minimum ratio for
larger banks. Resolution authorities would be provided with a statutory bail-in power to
assist resolution with the Government working to ensure that equivalent provisions were
adopted within European crisis management arrangements. Systemically important banks
should hold a further amount of loss absorbing capital on a group-wide basis although
non-U.K. operations may be exempt where there was no risk to U.K. financial stability.
While the Government supported depositor preference, further work and consultation
would be undertaken. A distinction was drawn between critical service protection and
investor protection with losses being imposed on investors, including creditors, where
necessary. All banks should be subject to normal competitive forces and be capable of
necessary resolution without reliance on any implicit government guarantee and risking
critical services. The Government would also adopt special resolution measures for in-
vestment firms and financial holding companies in addition to banks.isl
The Government accepted the ICB recommendations on improving competition espe-
cially through the creation of a strong and effective challenger bank with the Lloyds di-
vestiture 82 Action would be taken to limit barriers to entry and anti-competitive
prudential requirements, to improve switching, to enhance transparency, and to secure
pro-competitive financial regulation. The government's earlier perceived, implicit guar-
antee for "too big to fail" banks would be removed, which was stated to remove distortions
within the European single market. The Government also accepted the Treasury Select
Committee recommendation that the Payments Council should be brought within the
scope of U.K. regulation.
178. See GOV'T RFsPONSE TO rTi INDEP. COMi'N ON BANKING, supra note 174, 11 1.8-1.9.
179. Id. at 5.
180. Id. at 6.
181. Id. at 17 (discussing resolving investment banks); 19-20 (summarizing other U.K. and international
financial regulation).
182. Id. at 8.
FALL 2012
810 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
The Government estimated that the aggregate private cost to U.K. banks of implemen-
tation of the ICB recommendations would be around £3.5 to £8.0 billion as against the
£4.0 to £7.0 billion ICB figure. 8 3 This should produce a gross reduction in the GDP of
£0.8 to £1.8 billion, which was less than the £1.0 to £3.0 billion estimated by the ICB.184
The ICB claimed that its recommendations could reduce the annualized cost of financial
crisis by up to £40 billion a year.'85 The Government estimated that if other regulatory
reforms reduce the probability of crisis by 30 percent and the ICB recommendations by a
further 10 percent, the incremental economic benefit would be £9.5 billion per year even
assuming an output loss of 25 percent. 8 6
Further primary and secondary legislation would be adopted to give effect to the ring-
fence recommendations which would be enacted before the end of the current Parliament
in May 2015, with banks being expected to comply as soon as practicably possible. 8 7 A
reasonable transitional timetable would be provided for. A White Paper is to be produced
during 2012 containing detailed proposals on the implementation of the ICB
recommendations.
VIII. Govermnent Regulatory Policy
The Coalition Government has taken forward a number of other separate policy initia-
tives in connection with financial stability and financial growth more generally within the
U.K. economy. 18 This larger financial services policy agenda includes the institutional
restructuring referred to with the creation of the FPC, PRA, and FCA, as well as the
setting up and acceptance of the recommendations of the ICB under Sir John Vickers.
The Labour Administration had earlier set up U.K. Investments Limited to manage the
government's interests in recapitalized banks with the distressed (toxic) assets of the larg-
est banks being supported by a guarantee scheme through the Asset Protection Agency
(APA). The FSA adopted a strengthened remuneration Code as part of its Handbook of
Rules and Guidance. The Coalition Government has transformed the earlier Labour Ad-
ministration one-year bonus tax into a permanent Bank levy generating around £2.5 bil-
lion per year.' 89 The Government has also been in discussion with the banks to ensure
their adherence to its Code of Practice on Taxation, which promotes strong governance in
this area and adopts a preventative approach to tax avoidance. Fifteen of the major U.K.
banks had agreed to support the Code by November 2010.190
These are important initiatives in attempting to ensure that the finance industry sup-
ports growth in the wider economy with higher standards of disclosure and best practice
being adopted in certain key areas including remuneration, which will improve the rela-
183. Id. at 8-9.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 8.
186. Id. at 9.
187. Id.
188. Id. 1 1.7.
189. See ANTONY SEELY, HOUSE OF COMMONs LIBRARY, PUB. SN05251, TAXATION OF BANKING, at 14
(Apr. 11, 2012), available at http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN05251.
190. See Press Release, HlM Treasury, Top 15 Banks Sign Code of Practice (Nov. 30, 2010) (U.K), http://
www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/press_66_10.htm.
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tionship between the public and financial firms. These initiatives are considered in fur-
ther detail below.
A. U.K. FwcANcLpL INVESTmENTS (UKFI) AND THE ASSET PROTECTION AGENCY
(APA)
During the most severe part of the financial crisis in autumn 2008, the Government was
forced to support the major U.K. banks and financial markets following the collapse in
global and U.K. stock market prices. Prime Minister Gordon Brown and the then Chan-
cellor Alistair Darling announced a three-part package of measures on October 8, 2008
which involved providing up to £50 billion bank recapitalization, £250 billion of wholesale
funding guarantees, and a doubling of market liquidity to £200bn under the Bank of En-
gland's Special Liquidity Scheme (SLS). 191 Nineteen billion pounds were subsequently
made available to RBS, £12 billion to Halifax Bank of Scotland (HBOS), and £5 billion to
Lloyds TSB through the U.K. Bank Recapitalization Fund (BRF). 192 While other major
banks were able raise capital from the markets, further funds had subsequently to be made
available to the new Lloyds Banking Group (LBG following the merger of Lloyds TSB
and HBOS) and RBS, which received £45 billion in total. The Government effectively
assumed an 84 percent interest in RBS and a 43 percent interest in LBG.19 3 Special com-
petition dispensation had to be provided to create LBG due to its acquisition of 32 percent
of the U.K. mortgage market. 194 The Government's investment in RBS and LBG are
held through U.K. Financial Investments (UKFI) Limited, which was set up on Novem-
ber 31, 2008.195
The Government was forced to set up a separate asset support scheme in January 2009
following continued volatility in the markets. The Troubled Asset Restructuring Program
(TARP) had been approved in the United States in October 2008, which provided for the
purchase of distressed (toxic) assets from major U.S. banks and other financial groups. 196
While the first tranche of the TARP was used to provide additional capital for banks on a
U.K. model, the provision of some form of asset support was considered in other coun-
tries. The Labour Administration in the United Kingdom decided to establish an insur-
ance, rather than purchase, scheme that provided for public guarantees to be provided to
cover possible losses on distressed assets retained on bank balance sheets. The new Asset
191. See Alistair Darling, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Statement to the House of Commons on Financial
Stability (Oct. 8, 2008) (U.K), available at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100407010852/http://
www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/statement-chx800108.htm.
192. See Alistair Darling, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Statement to the House of Commons on Financial
Markets (Oct. 13, 2008), available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/statementchx_13_10_08.htm; U.K.
FIN. I'ws. LTD, UPDATES OF UFKI MARKET INVESTMENTS 8 (Mar. 2010), available at http://www.
ukfi.co.uk/publicationsl.
193. SCOTTISH AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, BANKING IN SCOTLAND, 2009-10, H.C. 70-1, at 10 (U.K); UPDATES
OF UFKI, supra note 192, at 8.
194. See OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, ANTICIPATED ACQUISnTION BY LLOVDs TSB PLC OF HBOS PLC 96,
113 (Oct. 24, 2008) (U.K.), http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared-oft/press-release-attachments/LLloydstsb.pdf.
195. See What We Do, U.K FIN. IN'vS. LTD, http://www.ukfi.co.uk/about-us/what-we-do/ (last visited Oct.
7, 2012).
196. The TARP was intended to provide for the purchase of US$700 billion of mortgage-backed securities
and preferred stock from banks under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008. See generally
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (enacted Oct. 3, 2008).
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Protection Scheme (APS) was managed by the Asset Protection Agency (APA) that was
established as an Executive Agency of the Treasury.1 97
The objectives of the APS are to support the stability of the U.K. financial system, to
increase confidence and capacity to lend, and to support the economy by protecting par-
ticipating financial institutions against exceptional credit losses on agreed asset portfo-
lios. 198 The overriding objective of the APA is to protect taxpayers' interests with its
functions and responsibilities being set out in a Framework Document. 199 The APA oper-
ates with a small permanent staff and relies on the operational cooperation of RBS, which
was initially the sole participating bank. The APA Chief Executive is supported by an
Advisory Board. The APA is legally part of the Treasury, although it operates on an arm's
length basis as a separate executive agency.
The APA provides protection against future credit losses on defined asset portfolios in
exchange for a fee. The APA provides protection against £282 billion of "Covered Assets"
held by RBS. RBS accepted an initial uncovered First Loss Amount of £60 billion, with
the Treasury paying 90 percent of any excess in the event of a "Trigger" event, including
failure to pay, bankruptcy, or restructuring. 200 RBS will have to pay £700 million per year
in fees for three years and then £500 million per year until 2099 in the event of no prior
disposal. 20 1 RBS has to cooperate with the APA in ensuring that the assets covered are
managed and administered in accordance with the Asset Management Objective (AMO),
which is to maximize expected net present value (NPV) and minimize losses.
B. REMUNERATION CODE
The issue of remuneration was considered by the FSA at an early stage during the crisis
with a draft Remuneration Code being issued in 2009 and then further revised in 2010
under relevant E.U. rules that took effect on January 1, 2011.202 The FSA Code specifies
a general requirement that remuneration polices must promote effective risk management
with twelve more specific key principles in designing acceptable bonus packages for
banks.20 3 The issue of Corporate Governance in U.K. banking was also considered by a
separate review committee under Sir David Walker, former Executive Director of the
197. See Asset Protection Agency, HIM TREASURY, http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/apa.htm (last visited Oct. 6,
2012) (U.K.).
198. See ASSET PROTECTION AGENCY, ANNUAL REPORT AND ACCOUNTS 2009-10, 2009-10, H.C. 259,
T 2.1 (U.K.), available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/apa-annual_report_0910.pdf.
199. See Asset Protection Agency, Asset Protection Agency Framework Document, HM TREASURY, http://www.
hin-treasury.gov.uk/d/apa-framework-document.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2012) (U.K.).
200. ANNUAL REPORT AND ACcOuNrs 2009-10, supra note 198, at 21.
201. Id. at 32.
202. See FSA HANDBOOK, supra note 9, § 19A.1.3. See generally FSA, PUB. CP09/01, REFORMING REMU-
NERATION PRACTICES IN FINANCIAL SERVICES (Mar. 2009) (U.K.); FSA, PUB. PS09/15, REFORMING REMU-
NERAIION PRACTICES IN FINANCIAL SERVICES, FEEDBACK ON CP09/10 AND FINAL RULES (Aug. 2009)
(U.K.). On the late amendments, see FSA, PUB. CPI0/19, REVISING THE REMIUNERAION CODE (July 2010)
(U.K.); FSA, PUB. PS10/20, REVISING THE REMUNERATION CODE, FEEDBACK ON CP10/19 AND FINAL
RULES (Dec. 2010) (U.K.); FSA, PUB. CP10/27, IMPLAIEAN'TING CRD3 REQUIREMENTS ON THE DISCLO-
SURE OF RE MUNERATION (Nov. 2010) (U.K.); FSA, PuB. PS10/21, LMPLEmEN-TING CRD3 REQUIREMENTS
ON THE DISCLOSURE OF RFmUNERATION (Dec. 2010) (U.K.).
203. See FSA HANDBOOK, supra note 9, § 19A.2.1, .3(3).
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Bank of England.20 4 The Walker Committee produced its final Review in July 2009,205
which identified five key themes and set out thirty-nine recommendations to strengthen
governance, organization and practice within financial institutions. 20 6 The application of
equivalent recommendations to non-financial firms was considered separately by Sir
Christopher Hogg, Chairman of the Financial Report Council (FRC) that was examining
the application of the U.K. Combined Code on Corporate Governance for all listed com-
panies in the United Kingdom.2 07
Remuneration raises difficult and sensitive issues in public and private companies. Di-
rectors and managers should be properly incentivized and rewarded, provided that this
does not distort risk taking and the fair distribution of profit within firms, including be-
tween staff and shareholders. Certain distortive elements had been allowed to be included
within individual payment packages and especially with many calculations being carried
out on a gross rather than a net earnings basis and with bonus payments being guaranteed.
Much of this has since been corrected through the FSA Remuneration Code, which repre-
sents an intelligent and balanced package of designed guidelines. Larger governance
structures have also been strengthened following the recommendations of the Walker
Committee Review.
C. BANK LEVY
The Labour Administration in the U.K. announced in the 2009 Pre-Budget Report that
a temporary Bank Payroll Tax would be imposed on bankers' bonuses of 50 percent over
£25,000 (equivalent to a 33.3 percent income tax).2 0s The Government had acquired an
84 percent stake in RBS and 43 percent stake in LBG, which made the high bonus pay-
ments announced politically sensitive.20 9 The temporary tax appeared to represent an in-
telligent compromise position while major financial groups remained within Government
ownership. While some staff were transferred, or asked to be transferred, abroad to avoid
the tax, many of the major institutions decided to pay amounts equal to the tax to retain
key staff. The estimated income was approximately £3 billion.210 The Coalition Govern-
ment later announced that they would replace the temporary tax with a permanent Bank
Levy on U.K. bank balances and building societies starting on January 2011. This was
justified based on the need for banks to contribute to the supposed costs of the support
that they received from the Government on an implied basis rather than to limit bonus
payments directly.
204. See Press Release, HM Treasury, Indep. Review of Corporate Governance of UK Banking Indus. (Feb.
9, 2009) (U.K.), http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20l00407010852/http://www.hm-treasury.gov.
uk/press L0.09.hon.
205. See DAVID WALKER, A REVIEW OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN UK BANKS AND OTIIER FINANCIAL
INDUSTRY ENTITIES 8-18 (uly 16, 2009).
206. See id. at 10-18 (including recommendations related to board size, composition and qualification, board
function and evaluation of performance, institutional shareholder role, communication and engagement, risk
governance, and remuneration).
207. See FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, 2009 REVIEW OF TI IF COMBINED CODE: FINAL REPORT 11 (Dec.
2009).
208. See Seely, supra note 189, at 1, 6.
209. BANKING IN SCOTLAND, sutpra note 193, at 10; UPDATES OF UFKI, supra note 192, at 8.
210. HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, BANK LEvY-TECHNICAL NOTE 10 (Dec. 9, 2012) (U.K.), http://www.
hmrc.gov.uk/drafts/tn-bank-levy.pdf.
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The permanent Bank Levy was confirmed in the June 2010 Budget. A consultation
document was issued on July 13, 2010 with a response document on October 21, 2010 to
which was attached initial draft legislation. 21 The levy would be included as a Schedule
to the Finance Bill (No. 3) for 2010.212 The levy would be based on total chargeable
equity and liabilities as reported on the relevant balance sheets of the banks and banking
and building society groups affected. This would operate on a balance sheet model above
£20 billion. 213 The levy was set at a rate of 0.05 percent for 2011 and 0.075 percent for
2012.214 The levy would be charged through existing corporation tax using the Quarterly
Installment Payments (QIPs) system.
The Government argued that the levy was based on that proposed by the IMF in its
Report to the G20 tided A Fair and Substantial Contribution by the Financial Sector in June
2010.215 This discussed the possible creation of three new charges with a Financial Stabil-
ity Contribution (FSC or bank tax), a Financial Activities Tax (FAT), and a Financial
Transaction Tax (FTT).216 The U.S. Obama Administration proposed a Financial Crisis
Responsibility Fee of $90 billion over ten years on U.S. banks with assets of more than
$50 billion.217 The U.K. bank levy was claimed to be justified based on the perceived
need to ensure that the banking sector makes a fair contribution that reflects the risks they
pose to the financial system and wider economy. 2 18
The proper justification for a bank levy remains unclear. 219 A levy, or FSC, only re-
flects the Government's potential contingent liabilities to support the financial system in
the event of an extreme crisis that will exist in any case. This arguably also simply reflects
the benefits that society receives from the financial industry in terms of the functions
211. See HM TREASURY, BANK LEVY: A CONSULTATION (July 2010) (U.K.), http://www.hm-treasury.
gov.uk/consult bank..levy.htm; see also Government Publishes Final Legislation on the Bank Levy, HM TREASURY
(Dec. 9, 2009) (U.K.), http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/press-70_l0.htm.
212. See Draft Legislation: Bank Levy, HM REVENUE & CusToMs, http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/drafts/bank-
levy.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2012) (U.K.). The Schedule extends to seventy-nine paragraphs with nine Parts,
consisting of: Introduction (Part 1), Charging of Bank Levy (Part 2), Groups covered by the Bank Levy (Part
3), Chargeable equity and liabilities (Part 4), Supplementary provision (Part 5), Collection and management
(Part 6), Double taxation relief (Part 7), Definitions (Part 8), and Power to make consequential changes (Part
9). Id.; BANK LEVY-TECHNICAL NOTE, supra note 210, at 3.
213. BANK LEvY-TEcHNICAL Norm, supra note 210, at 5.
214. Id.
215. See BANK LEVY: A CoNsULTA-rON, supra note 211, 3.2 (discussing Int'l Monetary Fund [IMFI, A
Fair and Substantial Contribution by the Financial Sector, Final Report for the G-20 (June 2010), available at http://
www.imf.org/external/np/g20/pdf/062 710b.pd0.
216. SeeA Fair and Substantial Contribution, supra note 215, at 7. The FSC could be imposed on liabilities or
assets or both at either a flat or variable rate. Id. The FAT would be imposed on bank profits and remunera-
tion taxes. Id. The FTT could be imposed on a defined range of financial instruments or transactions includ-
ing currency positions, stocks, bonds and financial derivatives. Id. at 19. The FTF constitutes a form of
'Tobin tax' as originally proposed by The Economist Tobin. Id. The FIT had been supported by the Ger-
man Government at the November 2009 G20 Financial Ministers meeting in Scotland, although this was
rejected. See id. at 19-21.
217. Id. at 7.
218. See BANK LEVY: A CONSULTATION, supra note 211, 1 1.7. "The Levy is intended to ensure that banks
make a contribution that reflects the potential risk to the [U.K.] financial system and wider economy from
bank failures and consequent loss of consumer and investor confidence." Id. 1 1.8.
219. IMF Bank Tax Proposals Cause Controversy, BRETTON WOODS PROJECT (June 17, 2010), http://www.
brettonwoodsproject.org/art-5663 55. See also Richard T Page, Foolish Revenge or Shrewd Regulation? Finan-
cial-Industry Tax Law Reforms Proposed in the Wake of the Financial Crisis?, 85 TUL. L. REV. 191, 193 (2010).
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carried out. Unless the levy is used to fund a resolution mechanism or otherwise prevent
crises or support crisis management, it cannot be considered to improve financial stability
as such. It otherwise only constitutes an alternative form of a business or corporation
taxation.
D. PROJECT MERLIN
The Government announced the conclusion of negotiations over Project Merlin on
February 9, 2011 after an extended negotiation period.220 A separate statement was issued
by Barclays, HSBC, LBG, and RBS collectively on February 9, 2011.221 The objective
was to secure a commitment to increase lending to businesses and, in particular, small and
medium sized enterprises (SMEs) from £179 billion in 2010 to £190 billion in 2011.222
Seventy-six billion pounds would be made available to SMEs directly, which represented a
15 percent increase from 2010.223 The Bank of England would monitor the banks' aggre-
gate gross new lending with the results being published on a quarterly basis. Aggregate
bonus pools would also be reduced from 2009 with the bonuses paid to the five highest
paid senior executive officers being published annually on an unnamed basis. Additional
support of around £1.2 billion would be made available to support regional growth with
£200 million being provided over two years to assist set up the Government's proposed
"Big Society Bank."224 The Treasury considered that the measures constituted a demon-
stration by the banks of their social responsibility and support for U.K. businesses.
In entering into the agreement, the banks stated that they "explicitly [recognized] their
responsibility to support economic recovery" with key commitments on lending, tax, pay,
and other economic contributions.225 Corresponding undertakings were nevertheless ex-
pected from the Government. The banks expected a commitment by the Government to
"the [stabilization] and improvement of the relationship between the Government and the
banks" as well as "the creation of a level playing field internationally for [U.K.] banks"
(consistent with G20 commitments) and the acceptance of the "right of self-determination
by bank boards" subject to increased shareholder engagement.2 26 The objective was to
reverse the continuing anti-financial sector "bank bashing" position adopted by the Gov-
ernment and its use of this position for political and media advantage.2 27
220. Press Release, HM Treasury, Gov't Welcomes Banks' Statements on Lending 15% More to SMEs, and






225. Barclays et. al., Project Merlin-Banks' Statement, HM TREASURY 1 (Feb. 9, 2011), http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/bankagreement_090211 .pdf.
226. Id.
227. Richard Fletcher, Let's Hope Merlin Casts a Powerful Enough Spell to Banish Bank Bashing, THE TELE-
GRAPH (Feb. 10, 2011, 6:00 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/richardfletcher/8314905/
Lets-hope-Merlin-casts-a-powerful-enough-spell-to-banish-bank-bashing.html.
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E. CODE OF PRACTICE ON TAXATION
The major U.K. banks further agreed to comply with HMRC's Code of Practice on Taxa-
tion for Banks under their February 2011 Project Merlin Statement.228 The purpose of the
Code was to encourage banks to adopt certain best practices with regard to taxation man-
agement.2 29 Banks may undertake appropriate tax planning to support their business
needs, although they should not engage in tax avoidance.2 30 The Chancellor expressed
the Government's commitment to ensuring that the banking sector maintained strong
governance on taxation with banks adhering to the Code by November 2010.231 Fifteen
major U.K. banks confirmed their adherence to the Code.
IX. U.K. Regulatory Comments and Conclusions
A substantial amount of regulatory reform has been announced in the United Kingdom
since the General Election in May 2010. Much of this has been more institutional and
structural rather than substance based until now. In institutional terms, the role and func-
tion of the Bank of England has been strengthened further with the establishment of the
separate FPC and PRA within the Bank Group, as well as with the creation of the FCA as
a separate independent agency. Some structural separation has also been proposed by the
ICB with the creation of retail ring-fences within the larger banks and groups.
These reforms have also been brought forward as part of a larger policy framework that
includes a continuing bank investment program, bank levy and bank lending arrange-
ments, and strengthened requirements on bank bonuses and remuneration. Supervisory
approach has also been made more interventionist with arrangements having to be made
to implement Basel 11 and other international and European reform agenda in the United
Kingdom.
The following more specific comments and conclusions may be drawn on the most
recent U.K. reforms at this time.
A. CRisis REACTION AND OPPORTuNITY
The outgoing Labour Administration had already brought forward a number of initia-
tives in response to the emerging financial crisis and subsequent events. The crisis in the
United Kingdom was principally contained with the announcement of the U.K. three-
point plan produced by Prime Minister Gordon Brown and the then Chancellor Alistair
Darling on October 8, 2008 that involved up to £50 billion bank recapitalization, £250
billion of wholesale funding guarantees, and a doubling of market liquidity to £200 billion
under the Bank of England's Special Liquidity Scheme (SLS). 2 32 The Government had
separately supported the merger of Lloyds TSB and HBOS on September 17, 2008 and
had set up in early 2009 a distressed (toxic) asset guarantee scheme based on insuring
228. Prject Merlin-Banks' Statement, supra note 225, at 3.
229. HM RVENUi' & CUSTOMS, CODE OF PRACrICE ON TAXATION FOR BNKSS 19 (June 2009).
230. Id. at 15.
231. HM TREASURY, SPENDING REVIEW, 2010, Cm. 7942, at 30 (U.K.).
232. Statement of Alistair Darling, supra note 191.
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assets on the balance sheets of the banks in return for a fee rather than outright asset
purchases as proposed by the original TARP in the United States.233
The Labour Administration established a comprehensive Special Resolution Regime
(SRR) that included private bank transfer, bridge bank transfer, and public acquisition (or
nationalization) options, as well as a separate special Bank Administration Procedure
(BAP) and Bank Insolvency Procedure (BIP) under the Banking Act 2009 which also cre-
ated the CFS.234 A number of other reforms were introduced under the Financial Services
Act 2010, which included confirming an express financial stability objective for the Bank
of England.2 35 The FSA had adopted a separate Supervisory Enhancement Program
(SEP) following its investigation into the collapse of Northern Rock and had incorporated
a considerably strengthened Remuneration Code within its Handbook. 236 It had also pro-
duced its own considerably more onerous liquidity proposals, than those proposed by the
Basel Committee under Basel III, with the Government committing to implement the
higher capital requirements proposed by the ICB than would be adopted under the E.U.
CRD IV in Europe or Basel II globally.2 37
It is arguable that the reforms already adopted in advance of the May 2010 election may
have been sufficient to contain and respond to any future crises. The new Coalition Gov-
ernment nevertheless took the opportunity to strengthen these measures again with fur-
ther institutional reforms and announced the replacement of the CFS with the FPC
within the Bank of England and of the FSA with the PRA and FCA.238 The effect of this
has been to create a new central-bank-based macro-prudential model with the regulatory
delegation of non-systemic functions to an external agency. A more aggressive and in-
terventionist supervisory approach and culture would also be adopted, although much of
this had already been put in place by the FSA with its SEP, new product design regime,
and credible enforcement program. While many of these reforms were directed at finan-
cial stability, they were also to a significant extent politically driven.
B. TwrN PEAKs
The new U.K. system has been described as being based on the "Twin Peaks" model as
discussed in earlier literature and as adopted with some amendment in Australia following
the Wallis Commission Report.2 39 The new U.K. regime was nevertheless initially "Tri or
Tripled Peaked" with the creation of a separate prudential agency (the PRA), the original
233. See supra note 196.
234. Special Resolution, BANK ENG., http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financialstability/Pages/role/
risk-reduction/srr/default.aspx (last visited Oct. 7, 2012).
235. Financial Services Act 2010, cl. 1 (U.K.).
236. FSA, THE FSA's SUPERVISORY ENHANCEMENT PROGRAMME, IN RESPONSE TO THE INTERNAL Au-
Dr REPORT ON SUPERVISION OF NORTHERN ROCK I (Mar. 26, 2008) (U.K.), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/
other/enhancement.pdf; FSA HANDBOOK, supra note 9, ch. 19A (Remuneration Code).
237. See FSA, PuB. CP09/13, STRENGTHENING LIQUIDITY STANDARDS 2: LIQUIDITY REPORTING (Apr.
2009) (U.K.), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp09_13.pdf; FSA, PuB. CP08/22, STRENGTHENING LIQUID-
ITY STANDARDS (Dec. 2008) (U.K.), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cpO8-22.pdf; FSA, PuB. DP07/7, RE-
VIEW OF THE LIQUIDITY REQUIREMENTS FOR BANKS AND BUILDING SOCIETIES (Dec. 2007) (U.K.), http://
www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/dp0707.pdf.
238. What Does Regulatory Reform Mean for Your Business?, FSA, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/about/what/
reg.reform (last visited Oct. 7, 2012) (U.K.).
239. See FIN. SYs. INQUIRY, COMM. UNDER STAN WALLIS, FINAL REPORT (Mar. 1997) (Aus.).
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Consumer Protection and Markets Authority (CPMA, later renamed the FCA), and a
separate financial enforcement authority.240 The Government subsequently decided to
abandon the third agency and retain financial crime within the FCA, which would also be
responsible for consumer protection and stock market and exchange oversight. 241 Macro-
prudential policies are also now dealt with through the FPC, with prudential and conduct
regulation being managed by the PRA and FCA.242 While the FPC and PRA are still
within the larger Bank Group, the U.K. model is essentially still tripartite or, at least, only
partially twin peaks based.
The advantage of this model is that it creates a much stronger and more effective core
macro-prudential function at the same time as a single set of decision making, responsibil-
ity, and accountability lines within the central bank, which is responsible for monetary,
regulatory, and wider market oversight policy. Splitting prudential and conduct functions
is also intended to allow each to be carried out in a more specialized and dedicated man-
ner, although this could possibly have been dealt with by having separate teams or divi-
sions within the FSA. The difficulty that would have arisen in this case is that the Bank of
England would then have been administratively and operationally overloaded if it had
become responsible for monetary, regulatory, and macro-prudential, as well as payment
and market infrastructure, policy. It was for this reason that the decision was made to
transfer non-core systemic functions to the FCA. While some systemic concerns may still
arise with regard to markets and exchanges under FCA oversight, a functional compro-
mise had to be achieved in dividing respective regulatory functions between the PRA and
FCA.
The unfortunate, but inevitable, consequence of splitting previously integrated regula-
tory functions between two agencies means that a number of additional institutional, ad-
ministrative, and operational compromises have had to be adopted, making the underlying
legislative framework considerably more complex. A substantial amount of negotiation
effort, for example, within the Treasury Select Committee and Joint Parliamentary Com-
mittee had focused on ascribing the correct functions to each agency and ensuring that
they operate in a complementary and supportive manner. Effective exchange of informa-
tion and coordination arrangements have also had to be designed with two further Memo-
randa of Understanding (MoU) having to be drafted. 243 A considerable amount of daily
operational overlap will occur in practice with inevitable policy conflicts and contradic-
tions arising. A further unintended consequence has been the remuneration in dividing
responsibility between the PRA and FCA for representation on various European and
international committees where their own functions and mandates overlap. This will re-
quire considerable care and attention in practice.
240. Reform and Regulation: The Government's Approach to Financial Services Regulation, HM TREASURY, http:/
/webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.hm-treasury.gv.uk/reform-andregulation.htm (last vis-
ited Oct. 7, 2012) (U.K).
241. Regulatory Reform - Background, FSA, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/about/what/reg-reform/background (last
visited Oct. 7, 2012) (U.K).
242. HM TREASURY, NEW APPROACH TO Fi cIAL REGULATION, BUILDING A BETTER SYsTEM, 2011,
Cm. 1805 (U.K).
243. Memorandum of Understanding from FSA and HMRC for the Exchange of Information and Con-
ducting of Joint Visits Under the Money Laundering Regulations 2007 and Payment Services Regulations
2009 fJune 1, 2012) (U.K), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/mou/fsa-hmrc.pdf.
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C. FINANCIAL STABILITY
The new U.K. model has been designed to create a central bank based macro-pruden-
tial model. The advantage is that core systemic and financial system policies and functions
will be centered within the central bank. The Bank will then be responsible for monetary,
regulatory, and macro-prudential, as well as payment systems and infrastructure, policies.
The evident danger is that conflicts may arise between the policies, although their central-
ization within a single institution may allow for speedier and more effective resolution and
reconciliation. This centralization of authority has also necessitated the establishment of
strengthened internal governance and external oversight and accountability arrangements
to ensure that the Bank is capable of discharging its several functions in a proper, bal-
anced, independent, informed, and effective manner.
The Coalition Government had criticized the earlier tripartite system for resulting in
confusion of the roles and ultimate decision-taking responsibility of the Treasury, Bank of
England, and FSA with each having equal status. It is arguable that the functions of the
three separate agencies were already sufficiently clear under the earlier MoU that was
entered into between them in 1998 and revised in 2006 and that any decision errors dur-
ing the crisis were more to do with timing, complexity, or simply individual personalities
rather than with the nature of the underlying committee mechanism itself.2" The danger
of the new regime is that the earlier balance between the three agencies has been removed
with an over-centralization of authority in the Bank. It was principally for this reason that
the Bill has been amended to confer on the Chancellor a statutory right to issue directions
to the Bank in the event of another major crisis, with the relationship between the Trea-
sury and Bank still being governed by a new MoU on Crisis Management. The new
policy would accordingly appear to amount more to one of "institutional and operational
substitution" rather than clear and quantifiable "replacement or improvement." Much
will depend on how this is implemented and operates in practice and, in particular, under
the new MoU to be adopted.
D. MACRO-PRUDENTIAL OVERSIGHT
The recent crises in financial markets drew clear attention to the failure in most coun-
tries to monitor wider threats to market and systems stability. Risks and exposures were
allowed to build up in parts of the retail and wholesale markets that were not properly
supervised or regulated. Regulators claimed, in retrospect, that they were only responsi-
ble for the micro-institutional supervision of firms on an individual or solo basis while
central banks argued that they had no express authority or tools to deal with the wider
macro-prudential risks that they had already identified. A number of initiatives have since
been adopted to construct new macro-prudential regimes, such as with the FPC in the
United Kingdom, the Financial Stability Oversight Counsel (FSOC) set up under the
244. Memorandum of Understanding Between HM Treasury, The Bank of England, and The Financial
Services Authority (Mar. 26, 2006) (UK), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/pr/
2006/025.shtml.
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Dodd-Frank Act in the United States, 245 and European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) in
the European Union. 246
These are important initiatives although significant difficulties remain with regard to
constructing an effective macro-prudential function in practice. Initial problems arise in
defining "financial stability" and "financial instability," as well as the appropriate tests for
intervention, and in identifying the necessary data and information that has to be properly
collected, examined, and assessed. Where risks can be properly isolated, measured, and
assessed, further problems arise in agreeing on the necessary tools to apply.247 Existing
proposals, in particular, in the advanced economies have unfortunately often simply
tended to focus on raising capital adequacy further beyond existing Basel III levels, which
may only constrain bank lending and underlying market function disproportionately.
248
It has also often been assumed that the new macro-prudential agent should have direct
regulatory powers and authority. Effective macro-prudential function will nevertheless
involve monitoring a range of policies including monetary, regulatory, consumer protec-
tion, competition, and fiscal and economic policies together. Where an exposure arises in
a particular policy area, it may be more effective to have any specific response dealt with
by the particular agency concerned. The focus should possibly then be on macro-pruden-
tial "oversight" or supervision rather than direct regulation with macro-prudential control
or regulation being dealt with on a delegated rather than direct basis.
The effectiveness of the macro-prudential oversight undertaken may, in practice, ulti-
mately be dependent on the quality of the day-to-day information collection and assess-
ment undertaken and supporting inter-agency cooperation and coordination secured.
The Bank of England had a separate Financial Policy division, or wing, before the crisis,
and this is to be strengthened with the transfer of equivalent monitoring activities from
the FSA.249 The FSOC in the United States will be supported by the Office for Financial
Research (OFR) within the Treasury, which will retain its own Data Center and Research
and Analysis Center.250 Separate work has already been undertaken in identifying possible
relevant data models, or matrices, that may be used. 251 Domestic efforts will also have to
be coordinated with other cross-border systems, such as with the separate new financial
committee set up in the European Union with the European Banking Authority (EBA),
European Markets and Securities Authority (EMSA), and European Insurance and Occu-
pational Pension Authority (EIOPA), as well as with the IMF, BIS, and FSB at the inter-
national levels.
245. Dodd-Frank Wall Street and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 111, 124 Stat. 1376
(2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5321(a)); see also DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY RE-




246. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Community Macro-Prudential
Oversight of the Financial System and Establishing of a European Systemic Risk Board, at 3, COM (2009) 499 final
(Sept. 23, 2009).
247. See e.g., BANK OF ENG., INSTRUMENTS OF MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY (Dec. 2011), available at http:/
/www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/other/financialstabibty/discussionpaperl I 1220.pdf.
248. See e.g., BANK OF ENG., THE ROLE OF MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY (Nov. 2009), available at http:/l
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/news/2009/11 I Laspx.
249. Reform and Regulation: The Government's Approach, supra note 240.
250. 12 U.S.C. § 5322(a)(2)(A) (2006).
251. See e.g., GarryJ. Schinasi, Defining Financial Stability (IMF, Working Paper No. WP/04/187, 2004).
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E. FNANCIAL SERVICES BILL
The 2011 Financial Services Bill will on enactment create the new statutory regime for
financial regulation within the United Kingdom.2 52 Rather than preparing a separate,
clean, and integrated new statute, it was decided to proceed by way of statutory amend-
ment of the earlier FSMA rather than new full statutory replacement.253 This is unfortu-
nate from a policy and access perspective in that the consolidated statute has become
exceptionally more complex and difficult to follow. 254 This is also more politically ques-
tionable in that it suggests that the new regime is not as fundamentally revolutionary as
claimed. This nevertheless only reflects the regulatory reality of the reforms adopted.
These are essentially based on key aspects of institutional revision with some supervisory
adjustment. While separate handbooks will be produced by the PRA and FCA, much of
the substantive content of the earlier integrated regulatory regime may remain constant
and in place.
As with the earlier FSMA, the Financial Services Bill is also largely constitutional in
content because it specifies the functions of each of the key agencies involved and deter-
mines their respective powers and authority.255 Almost all of this is achieved through
amendments to the Bank of England Act 1998 and FSMA in Parts 1 and 2 of the Bill.256
Inquiries and investigations are strengthened under Part 5 with the resolution regime
under the Banking Act 2009 extended under Part 7.257 The only new provisions are with
regard to mutual funds in Part 3 and complaints in Part 6 with the Chancellor's powers of
direction in Part 4, although again much of this simply provides statutory recognition for
the early arrangements set out under the original tripartite MOU, albeit strengthened and
clarified.258
F. SUPERVISORY AND REGULATORY POLICY
The Treasury, Bank, and FSA have stressed the novelty of the new "regulatory ap-
proach" to be adopted by the PRA and FCA. This has been referred to in each of the
Government's consultation papers and the recent joint regulatory approach statements
issued. These documents set out the basis for a much more aggressive, interventionist,
and determinist supervisory approach. This had been referred to in the Turner Report2S9
and given effect under the FSA's SEP and credible deterrence enforcement policy,260 with
252. See generally Financial Services Bill, 2010-12, H.C. Bill [278] (U.K.). The Financial Services Bill has
subsequently been revised by both Houses of Parliament.
253. See generally Consolidated Version of FSMA, HM TREASURY (2012) (U.K.), http://www.hm-treasury.
gov.uk/d/consolidated-fsma-27022012.pdf (illustrating changes proposed by the Financial Services Bill
2011).
254. See id.
255. See, e.g., Financial Services Bill, 2010-12, H.C. Bill [2781 pt. 2, cl. 5 (U.K.)
256. See id. pts. 1, 2.
257. See id. pts. 5, 7.
258. See id. pts. 3-4, 6.
259. FSA, THE TURNER REviEW: A REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL BANRING CRIsis 88 (Mar.
2009) (U.K.), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turnerreview.pdf.
260. See Margaret Cole, Dir. of Enforcement, FSA, Annual Financial Crime Conference: Delivering Credi-
ble Deterrence (Apr, 27, 2009), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/speeches/2009/
0427_mc.shtrnl; Hector Sants, Chief Exec., FSA, The Reuters Newsmakers Event: Delivering Intensive Su-
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the FSA considerably increasing the severity of fines and penalties imposed since the cri-
sis. The FSA had earlier introduced and expanded its More Principles Based Regulation
(MPBR) approach using general principles rather than detailed rules.261 The FSA has also
produced new papers on such important policy matters as product regulation 262 and
Treating Customers Fairly (TCF)263 that have imposed additional new obligations on
firms and raised their oversight functions. Outgoing FSA Chairman Hector Sants had
also issued a number of speeches on the FSA adopting a more direct approach with regard
to promoting appropriate regulatory culture, including the area of financial ethics. 2 64
Before responsibility for bank supervision was transferred from the Bank of England to
the FSA under the Bank of England Act 1998, the supervisory approach adopted was often
described as being based on "moral suasion."265 This relied con either the non-legal or
non-statutory moral or market authority and reputation of the Bank. 266 The perceived
advantages of this system were its informal contact and judgment or discretionary based
nature. The idea of judgment and discretion has been re-used in the statements on the
Bank's and PRA's new regulatory approach.267 The new regulatory approach adopted
accordingly represents a composite of the more-interventionist FSA and judgment based
Bank approaches. All of this is to be welcomed, although it remains unclear how different
this will be from the already revised supervisory and regulatory practices adopted by the
FSA following the crisis and before its imminent dissolution.
pervision and Credible Deterrence (Mar. 12, 2009), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communica-
tion/speeches/2009/0312_hs.shtml; see also Hector Sants, Chief Exec., FSA, Bloomberg: Intensive
Supervision: Delivering the Best Outcomes (Nov. 9, 2009), available at http://wvw.fsa.gov.uk/library/com-
munication/speeches/2009/1109_hs.shtm.
261. See FSA, PRINCIPLES-BASED REGULATION: FOCUSING ON THE OUTCOMES THAT MATTER 4 (Apr.
2007) (U.K.), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/principles.pdf; see also Hector Sants, Chief Exec.,
FSA, Securities & Investments Institute Annual Conference: Principles Based Regulation: Lessons from the
Sub-Prime Crisis (May 15, 2008), available at http://www.fsa.gov.ulibbrary/communicaion/speeches/2008/
0515_hs.shtml.
262. See FSA, PUB. DP 11/01, PRODUCT IN-TERVENrTION 18 (Jan. 2011) (U.K), available at http://www.fsa.
gov.uk/pubs/discussion/dpl 1.0l.pdf; FSA, PUB. FS 11/03: PRODUCT INTERVENTION FEEDBACK ON DP 11/
1, at 11, 16-17 (June 2011) (U.K), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/fs11-03.pdf.
263. See FSA, TREATING CUSTOMERS FAIRLY INITrATIVE: PROGRESS REPORT 3 (May 2007) (UK), availa-
ble at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/tcf implementation.pdf; FSA, TREATING CUSTOMERS FAIRLY - TO-
WARDS FAIR OUTCOMES FOR CONSUMERS 11-13 (July 2006) (U.K), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/
other/tcf._towards.pdf.
264. See Hector Sants, Chief Exec., FSA, Mansion House Conference on Values and Trust: Can Culture be
Regulated? (Oct. 4, 2010), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/speeches/201O/lOO4_hs.
shtml; Hector Sants, Chief Exec., FSA, Chartered Institute of Securities and Investments Conference: Do
Regulators Have a Role to Play in Judging Culture and Ethics? (June 17, 2010), available at http://www.fsa.
gov.uk/library/communication/speeches/2010/0617_hs.shtml; Hector Sants, Chief Exec., FSA, Securities &
Investment Institute Conference 2009: The Regulator's Role in Judging Competence (May 7, 2009), available
at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/speeches/2009/0507 hs.shtml.
265. See Vincent P. Polizatto, Prudential Regulation and Banking Supervision: Building an Institutional Frame-
work for Banks 14 (The World Bank, Working Paper No. WPS 340, 1990).
266. See id.
267. BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM, supra note 3, at 7.
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G. RESOLUTION
A considerably strengthened resolution regime has been adopted in the United King-
dom under the Banking Act 2009.268 This provided for the creation of three core new
Special Resolution Regime (SRR) options with a private bank transfer, temporary
"bridge" bank transfer (on a U.S. model), and public acquisition (nationalization).2 69 The
Act also amends the existing laws to create a separate special Bank Administration Proce-
dure (BAP) and supporting Bank Insolvency Procedure (BIP).270
In practice, statutory special resolution will only work after banks' and financial institu-
tions' own internal Restructuring and Recovery Plans or Programs (RRPs) have failed. All
major financial institutions are being required to prepare internal contingency plans with
RRPs, which are often referred to "living wills" in the United Kingdom and European
Union or "funeral plans" in the United States. 271 The FSB has issued a recent paper on
the content of pre-crisis internal living wills and post-crisis resolution regimes that it col-
lectively refers to as RRPs.272 The FSB has also issued a number of other papers strength-
ening supervisory oversight and the regulatory treatment of SIFIs and G-SIFIs.2 73
While "Too Big To Fail" remains an important problem in all countries and at the
cross-border level, this should be of less significance going forward with the range of
initiatives that have already been undertaken to strengthen risk management, increase cap-
ital, liquidity and leverage standards, and improve pre-crisis internal restructuring RRPs
and post-crisis resolution SRRs of major financial institutions and groups. This should
substantially reduce the need for market support and fiscal bailouts.
H. MARKET SUPPORT
While major crises should be limited through the range of mechanisms referred to,
market support may still be required in the most extreme situations. The lack of effective
specific support mechanisms may have been considered to have significantly aggravated
key stages of the recent crisis. The Federal Reserve and Treasury claimed that they lacked
the necessary authority to support Lehman Brothers in September 2008 while the Bank of
England had earlier been advised that it could not provide covert support to Northern
Rock following its request for emergency assistance in August 2007. A range of ad boc
measures had to be subsequently adopted during the crisis, especially in the United States.
The Bank of England has issued one statement on this issue that refers to the need to have
268. See generally Banking Act 2009 (cl. 1) (U.K.).
269. See id. pt. 1, §§ 8-9.
270. See id. pt. 1, §§ 90-168.
271. See DELOrTTE, POSITIONING FOR A NEW FINANCIAL LANDSCAPE: ROLLING OUT A RECOVERY AND
RESOLUTION PLAN 2 (2010) (citing FINANCIAL STABILITY FORUM, FSF PRINCIPLES FOR CROss-BORDER
COOPERATION ON CRISIS MANAGEMENT (2009)).
272. See FSB, KEY AT-RIBUTE OF EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION REGIMES FOR FINANCIAL INSTrTUTIONS, an-
nex I (Oct. 2011) (U.K.).
273. See, e.g., FSB, PoLIcY MEASURES, supra note 93, at 1; FSB, EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION, supra note 93, at
7; FSB, FSB RECOMMENDATIONS AND TIME LINES, supra note 93, at 1-2; FSB, INTERIM REPORT TO G20
LEADERS, supra note 93. See also ASSESSMENT OF THE MACROECONOMIC IMPACT, supra note 93; GLOBAL
SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT BANKS, supra note 93; Measures for Global Systemically Important Banks, supra
note 93; GUIDANCE TO ASSESS THE SYSTEMIC IMPORTANCE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, supra note 93; A
COMMON DATA TEMPLATE, supra note 93, at 2.
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appropriate mechanisms in place where necessary. 274 Care has to be exercised to ensure
that markets realize that such mechanisms will only be used in the most extreme cases and
on a discretionary basis to limit the dangers of moral hazard, excessive reliance, and risk-
taking. The availability of such mechanisms will nevertheless always be important in reas-
suring markets and in preventing wider systemic contagion and collapse in the most ex-
treme cases.
1. COMPETION AND STRUCTURAL REGULATION
The U.K. Government has been concerned with the need to increase consumer protec-
tion and competition following the crisis. It was for this reason that the ICB was estab-
lished with both issues being examined on an independent and an authoritative basis. The
Interim and Final Reports of the ICB made a number of recommendations with regard to
improving regulation and increasing competition. 275 The ICB specifically proposed the
adoption of retail ring-fencing in the United Kingdom, with ring-fenced activities also
being supported by higher capital charges of around 10 percent and with other investment
banking activities being left to be dealt with under relevant international Basel Committee
standards. 276 The Commission has also recommended the further divestment of branches
by the Lloyds Banking Group (LBG) that it considers to have grown too large following
the merger of Lloyds TSB with HBOS.2 77
The Commission rejected any full separation of commercial and investment banking on
an earlier U.S. Glass-Steagall model with the retail ring-fence representing an apparently
intelligent compromise.278 This will placate public and media calls for higher protection
of retail functions without disproportionately undermining the competitive position of
larger banks and complex groups. The idea of structural ring-fencing (or "functional iso-
lation" or "functional separation") is highly useful, although this may have been better
used to protect all critical functions within all banks and not simply in respect of retail and
SME customers. This may then have little effect in protecting financial stability in prac-
tice and may be considered to be more of a consumer protection measure while retail and
SME customers have already been given higher deposit insurance protection payouts in
any case. It may also have been more appropriate to apply the increased 10 percent charge
to the higher-risk, non-retail, and investment banking activities, although this may still be
absorbed within the total new Basel III capital framework within the proposed 0 to 2.5
percent counter-cyclical or 0 to 3 percent systemic risk charges. 279 Reasonable competi-
tion should also always be promoted in the financial area, although care has to be taken to
ensure that markets do not become overly competitive with aggressive outiersreducing
standards elsewhere, such as with the sale of subprime loans in the United States or offer-
274. See Paul Tucker, Deputy Governor of Fin. Stability, Bank of Eng., SUERF, CEPS and Belgian Finan-
cial Forum Conference: Crisis Management at the Cross-Roads: The Crisis Management Menu (Nov. 16,
2009), available at http://www.bis.org/review/r091118d.pdf.
275. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 8, at 10-11, 16; INTERIM REPORT, supra note 7, at 51-60.
276. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 8, at 10-11.
277. See id. at 16.
278. See id. at 66.
279. See BASEL COMITTEE, BASEL I: A GLOBAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT
BANJs AND BANTKNG SYSTEMS 63-64 (June 1, 2011).
VOL. 46, NO. 3
U.K. REGULATORY REVISION 825
ing of exceptionally low loan-to-value (LTV) ratios and mortgage applications by North-
ern Rock in the United Kingdom.
J. WIDER FINANCI POLICY REFORM
The Government has undertaken a number of further policy initiatives to support long-
term growth and contribution, including through its asset protection facility, independent
bank shareholding, Bank Levy, Project Merlin lending support and bonus and remunera-
tion commitments, and the Taxation Code.
The U.K. asset insurance facility, set up under its APA in 2009, represents an important
model for managing distressed assets in other countries in the future. This allows the
assets to remain on a bank's balance sheet, which avoids any difficulties in agreeing on
disposal prices while the bank receives protection cover, reduces its regulatory capital ob-
ligations, and supports its share price. The U.K. scheme has also been successful in estab-
lishing a close operational relationship between the APA and the Royal Bank of Scotland
(RBS), in particular, in monitoring and managing the £282 billion covered asset portfolio
created for RBS.2s 0 This will assist to ensure that the manner in which the assets are
managed, controlled, documented, and processed will be improved over time.
The agreement eventually reached on Project Merlin represented an intelligent and
balanced compromise position between .the banks and the Government that provided for
the provision of reasonable credit, subject to market conditions, and executive pay com-
mitments without undermining internal bank governance and autonomy. The Govern-
ment has nevertheless since decided to replace this with the more direct £20 billion
National Loan Guarantee Scheme.2 81 Banks should have no difficulty in adhering to the
Taxation Code, provided that this is not used by the tax authorities to impose substantial
additional charges without proper due process and a clear legal basis. 28 2 More significant
concerns arise with regard to the permanent Bank Levy, which does not support financial
stability in any direct manner and arguably only constitutes a form of additional business
or corporation tax. This also contributes to creating a larger climate of over re-regulation
and penalty that may limit bank recovery and lending contrary to the Government's stated
policy in this area.
The U.K. bank capitalization program assisted stabilizing the banks' financial positions
as their share prices were falling. The Government principally purchased non-voting pre-
ferred stock that produced a reasonably generous return without interfering with the in-
ternal operations of the banks. These holdings were then managed through U.K.
Investments that acted on an independent, arm's length basis. The Government's invest-
ment in the banks will be disposed when the share prices recover sufficiently to produce a
reasonable profit or politically acceptable loss. Contradictions did arise in the manage-
ment of the scheme with the Government being placed under considerable political pres-
sure at the beginning of 2012 to use its 83 percent and 43 percent share positions in RBS
280. See FSA, THE FAILURE OF THE ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND: FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY
BOARD REPORT 11-12, 28-29 (Dec. 2011) (U.K.), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/other/rbs.pdf
(on the difficulties surrounding the support of RBS in the United Kingdom).
281. See ATrrUMN STATEMENT 2011, ctpra note 11, at 7.
282. See Megan Murphy et al., Barclays Faces Block on Tax Schemes, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2012, 8:55 PM),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/aa810760-6173-1le 1 -94fa-00l44feabdc0.htnl.
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and LBG, respectively, to limit bonus payments contrary to its non-interventionist and
open-market principles.28 3
K. INTERNTATIONAL AND E.U. POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
The United Kingdom will also implement all of the principal international regulatory
reform and other E.U. measures adopted following the crisis. These principally include
the Basel Committee's Basel III enhanced capital and new global liquidity and leverage
requirements.284 These will specifically be converted into relevant E.U. requirements, in
particular, with the further revised Capital Requirements Directive (CRD V), although a
number of Member States attempted to dilute some of these provisions in advance of
domestic implementation to favor local institutions. 285 A substantial number of other
E.U. measures have also been adopted, or proposed, that will have to be implemented in
the United Kingdom. These include the Alternative Investment Managers Directive
(AIFMD), which created a new registration and oversight regime for hedge funds, and the
Credit Rating Agency Regulation. 286 The earlier Markets in Financial Instruments Direc-
tive (MiFID) is being reviewed with the 2010 Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR),
which includes measures to strengthen controls on over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives
and credit default swaps, including through the use of Central Counterparties (CCPs). 2 97
The operation of the other core provisions is also being reconsidered, such as the Pro-
283. See Kate Burgess & Sharlene Goff, RBS Director Defends Hester Bonus Award, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 16,
2012, 9:52 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/89a6d49a-58bb-Ilel-b9c6-OO144feabdcO.html (the Hester bo-
nus was £963,000); Patrick Jenkins, RBS Chairman Gives Up Share Bonus, FIN. TvIMES (an. 26, 2012, 4:02
PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/fa30bae0-49c6-I lel-91b6-00144feabdc0.html; Sharlene Goff, Lloyds Chief
Waives Right to Bonus, FINA. TImES (Jan. 13, 2012, 11:29 AM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/O/dO4eeOf6-3dd4-
1lel-91ba-00144feabdcO.html; Amy Wilson, Lloyds-HBOS will be 43pc Owned by the Government, THE TELE-
GRAPH (Jan. 12, 2009, 7:45 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/42206
32/Lloyds-HBOS-will-be-43pc-owned-by-the-government.html.
284. See A GLOBAL REGULATORY FRAEWOR.K, supra note 279, at 2. Core Tier I capital (paid up share
capital and retained earnings) is to be increased from 2 percent to 4.5 percent, with a conservation buffer of
2.5 percent, which increases the core Tier 1 ratio to 7 percent. Id. at 28, 69. A discretionary 0.0 to 2.5
percent counter-cyclical buffer is also to be applied with a further systemic risk buffer of approximately 2
percent to 3 percent for larger banks and financial groups. Id. at 58. A new 3 percent Tier 1 leverage ratio
has also been introduced. Id. at 61. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL IH: INTERNA-
TIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR LIQUIDITY RISK MEASURFIMENTF, STANDARDS AND MONFORING 1 (Dec. 2010).
285. See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Access to the Activity of Credit
Institutions and the Prudential Supervision of Credit Institutions and Investment Firms and Amending Directive
2002/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Supplementary Supervision of Credit Institutions,
Insurance Undertakings and Investment Firms in a Financial Conglomerate, at 9, COM (2011) 453 final (July 7,
2011), available at http://eur- http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.douri=COM:2011:0453:FIN
:EN:PDF (describing the E.U. legislation in force and new proposals related to capital requirements for
credit institutions and investment firms).
286. See Council Directive 2011/61, 1 89, 2011 OJ. (L 174) 1 (EU); Regulation 513/2011, 1 35, 2011 O.J.
(L 145) 30 (EU); Regulation 1060/2009, T 75, 2009 OJ. (L 302) 1 (EC).
287. See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Markets in Financial Instruments
Repealing Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (Recast), at 2, 178, COM (2011)
656 final (Oct. 20, 2011); Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Markets in
Financial Instruments and Amending Regulation [EMIR] on OTC Derivatives, Central Counterparties and Trade
Repositories, T 31, COM (2011) 652 final (Oct. 20 2011).
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spectus, Transparency, and Market Abuse Directives.2 8  It has to be expected that the
European Commission will monitor other international and national developments, such
as those in the United States and all of the measures to be brought into effect under the
Dodd-Frank Act and implementing rules. 289 E.U. Commissioner Michel Barnier has re-
ferred to the European Union adopting over forty-seven measures in the financial area, all
of which will have to be transposed and converted into U.K. law.290
L. MARKET AND REGULATORY BALANCE
The core challenge within the United Kingdom and elsewhere has been to attempt to
achieve an appropriate balance between effective regulatory control and underlying mar-
ket function. This has specifically involved reconciling the needs of financial market earn-
ings and innovation as against financial market stability, as well as with efficient financial
markets and wider growth and recovery in the real economy. Any disproportionately ag-
gressive, and ultimately ineffective, re-regulation may only limit wider economic growth
and prosperity. Difficult policy decisions arise in this area while governments also have to
attempt to reconcile efficient debt management and fiscal budgetary discipline with indus-
trial, manufacturing, and service growth and recovery. Financial markets carry out key
functions without which the rest of the economy could not operate. The post-crisis chal-
lenge should not be to continue to punish financial institutions for earlier apparent fail-
ures or fault, but rather be to attempt to restore underlying core market functions and
services.
X. U.K. Regulatory Close
The reforms announced by the Coalition Government since its election in May 2 010 in
the U.K. constitute an important and significant experiment in institutional reform within
a new larger extended regulatory reform agenda. A number of interesting and valuable
initiatives have been taken forward. Substantial institutional change nevertheless necessa-
rily involves a corresponding number of institutional compromises. It has to be accepted
that institutional revision may be of limited effect by itself without further, more substan-
tial regulatory and operational supervisory changes. This is a bold new experiment and it
remains to be seen how it unfolds over time.
The new program is based on a number of key new elements. The role of the Bank of
England has been strengthened with three new agencies being created with the FPC,
PRA, and FCA and with consumer education and financial capability already having been
transferred to the CFEB. The effect is to create a new central-bank based macro-pruden-
tial model with the delegation of non-systemic regulatory function to an external agency.
A strengthened supervisory and enforcement policy has been adopted with some qualified
288. See Council Directive 2004/109, 191 23-25, 2004 Oj. (L 390) 38 (EC); Council Directive 2003/71,
TT 15-17, Oj. (L 345) 38 (EC); Council Directive 2003/6, j 19-33, 2003 Oj. (L 96) 16 (EC).
289. See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,124
Stat. 1376 (2010).
290. See EUROPEAN COMM'N, REGULATING FINANCIAL SERVICES FOR SUSTAINABLE GROWTH: A PRO-
GRESS REPORT 10-11 (Feb. 2011); see also EU Policy in Financial Services: Current EU Dossiers, H1M TREASURY,
http://www.hm-treasurygov.uk/8581.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2012) (U.K.) (contains a list of twenty E.U.
dossiers on policy in financial services).
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structural regulation proposed with the new retail ring-fencing recommended by the ICB
and with CCPs for OTC derivatives under supporting E.U. measures. All of this has been
built into a larger mixed critical function and economic growth framework to operate with
the Government's continuing austerity and deficit reduction package.
It is hoped that all of this should be sufficient to allow markets to continue to develop
and innovate, but in a more safe and stable manner and in a way that can support larger
economic growth and prosperity. The core challenge remains to balance financial innova-
tion and stability with immediate financial market income and benefit, but also wider
economic and social advantage and improvement. Financial markets are key drivers
within any economy, and growth will be impossible without their continued contribution
and support. A degree of regulatory review and re-regulation is necessary following the
devastating effects of the recent crises, although underlying market function and market
advantage must still be preserved.
The two key residual regulatory issues that have to be dealt with in all economies are in
connection with containing the potential damaging effects of SIFIs and G-SIFIs as well as
in constructing effective wider macro-prudential oversight and support regimes. The
dangers of too big to fail with SIFIs and G-SIFIs can principally be dealt with through
improved risk management and strengthened capital, liquidity, and leverage, as well as
effective pre-crisis and post-crisis resolution mechanisms. All of this has been imple-
mented in the United Kingdom under the reforms announced by the outgoing Labour
Administration and statutory changes brought into effect under the Banking Act 2009 and
Financial Services Act 2010. Macro-prudential function will now be brought forward
under the new FCP model created. One significant omission remains in terms of market
support. While it has to be hoped that all of the new macro-prudential oversight and
resolution mechanisms, especially with regard to G-SIFIs and GSIBs, will be sufficient to
prevent any further future systemic threats from arising, it will still be essential to have in
place necessary extended market support facilities, beyond more traditional LLR, in the
event of an extreme crisis arising, such as through cross-border or inter-regional distur-
bances or more simple technical or electronic transmission and contagion.
It remains to be seen how all of this will further evolve and operate over time. A sub-
stantial post-crisis reform package was constructed before the May 2010 election, al-
though this will be further strengthened through the additional institutional changes
announced and, in particular, with the creation of a powerful new macro-prudential model
at the core of the system. This will provide an alternative option to the multi-agency,
collective, or composite U.S. model with its FSOC and the inter-agency and cross-border
E.U. ESRB. All of these still provide important institutional choices for consideration and
adoption in other countries or regions. Many of the key lessons from the crisis have been
recognized and acted on in the United Kingdom, United States, and elsewhere. These
measures may not prevent further future crises as such, although they may be sufficient to
avoid the devastating market and wider economic and social damage caused by the last
crisis. We can only hope so.
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